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Notes
THE SUPREME COURT'S LATEST RENDITION OF EQUALITY IN
EDUCATION: EXAMINING THE TRADITIONAL
COMPONENTS OF SUCCESS IN
MISSOURI v. JENKINS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, provides that "[n]o
State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."' Not until 1954, however, did the United States
Supreme Court hold that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, state-im-
posed racial segregation of public schools deprives African-Americans
equal protection of the laws.
2
The progeny of school desegregation cases that followed this holding
projected the nation into a protracted mission aimed at integrating
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Originally adopted to terminate the institu-
tion of African-American slavery in the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment
became the cornerstone of equal protection in America's school systems. John M.
Jackson, Comment, Remedy for Inner City Segregation in the Public Schools: The Necessry
Inclusion of Suburbia, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 415, 415 (1994). In its first cases interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court interpreted its pro-
tections to declare all forms of discrimination against African-Americans unconsti-
tutional. Id. at 415 n.2. (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-72
(1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), overruled by Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)). The Court in Strauder, interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment, stated:
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for
the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall
stand equal before the laws of the States, and .... that no discrimination
shall be made against them by law because of their color?
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307; see also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879), over-
ruled by City of Greenwood v. Peakcock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966) (finding that Four-
teenth Amendment applies exclusively to state action).
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown 1). The Court in
Brown Ioverruled the doctrine set forth in Plessy v. Ferguson. Id. at 494-95; see also
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (finding law allowing railway companies to
provide separate but equal railway coaches for white and black passengers constitu-
tional), overruled by Brown I, 347 U.S. at 483. The circumstances in Plessy did not
implicate public education, rather it involved public transportation. Plessy, 163 U.S.
at 538. The holding and rationale of Plessy provided the justification for "separate
but equal" schools; establishing that public transportation could be provided in
.separate but equal" facilities. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51; see also Brown 1, 347 U.S. at
488 (stating that under Plessy, "equality of treatment is accorded when the races are
provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate");
Jackson, supra note 1, at 415 n.4 (stating that concept of separate but equal was
adopted from holding and rationale of Plessy). For a further discussion of the
Court's holding in Brown I, see infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
(1395)
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America's schools.3 Now, over forty years later, federal courts are still at-
tempting to measure the success of these desegregation efforts and to cre-
ate innovative ways to overcome the remaining effects of state-imposed
segregation.
4
When measuring a school district's success at desegregation, federal
courts must often decide whether a school district deserves "unitary sta-
tus."5 Disagreement exists among federal courts, however, concerning
3. Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination of Uni-
tary Status Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
Ruv. 1105, 1106 (1990). For a discussion of the history of school desegregation,
see infra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.
4. See Mary Jordan, Segregated School Compensation Results in Scant Gain, Study
Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1994, at A4 (explaining that despite courts' varying ef-
forts to desegregate schools, many school districts remain segregated). For an ex-
ample of a court's effort to desegregate a school system, see infra notes 30-33 and
accompanying text.
5. Brown, supra note 3, at 1106-07. The exact definition of unitary status is
highly controversial, as is the effect of a determination of unitary status on continu-
ing desegregation plans. Id. at 1107 n.7. Generally, a school district secures uni-
tary status when it achieves the goal of removing all vestiges of prior racial
discrimination. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13
(1971) (stating that school board has burden of completely removing segrega-
tion); Brown, supra note 3, at 1107-08. As the Supreme Court has noted, however,
considerable disparity exists among lower federal courts' definitions of "unitary."
Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245 (1991); see alsoJ. Braxton Craven,
Jr., Integrating the Desegregation Vocabulary-Brown Rides North, Maybe, 73 W. VA. L.
REv. 1, 1-2 (1971) (noting that "unitary" is not clearly defined); TA. Smedley,
Developments in the Law of School Desegregation, 26 VAND. L. REv. 405, 405-06 (1973)
(finding no clear standard of unitariness). But see Northcross v. Board of Educ.,
397 U.S. 232, 236 (1970) (Burger, CJ., concurring) (rejecting contention that
unitariness is undefined). Due to the lack of a clear definition, courts use many
different meanings of unitariness. Brown, supra note 3, at 1107 n.7. Some courts
use the term to indicate that a school district meets the requirements of Brown I.
See, e.g., United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that school district is released from consequences of past misdeeds when it elimi-
nates vestiges of segregated system); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 532-33
(4th Cir.) (finding that unitary status is achieved when all aspects of public educa-
tion are freed from vestiges of state sanctioned racial segregation), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 938 (1986); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985)
(finding that unitary status is achieved by eliminating dual system and replacing it
with one that eliminates all vestiges of segregation). Other courts, meanwhile, use
the term "unitary" in reference to school districts that have desegregated student
assignments. See, e.g., Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1503 (10th Cir.
1989) (holding that within context of finding unitariness, student reassignment
plan must be judged by its effectiveness in maintaining unitary school system),
rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). Still, one other circuit drew a distinc-
tion between "unitary school districts," that do not operate segregated schools over
an extended period of time, with "unitary status," which connotes a removal of all
vestiges of past discrimination. NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1413 n.12 (11th
Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court, however, expressed concerns in Dowell about us-
ing such precise definitions and explicitly refrained from using such definitions in
Dowell or Freeman v. Pitts. Dowel 498 U.S. at 245-46; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
487 (1992). For a further discussion of Dowell and Freeman, see infra notes 55-75
and accompanying text. Despite these disclaimers, the Supreme Court provided
some guidance on unitary status stating that a unitary school system is one "within
1396 [Vol. 40: p. 1395
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what factors to consider when contemplating a school district's attainment
of unitary status. 6 The Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to
shed some light on this debate in Missouri v. Jenkins.
7
The Supreme Court in Jenkins granted certiorari after the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied rehearing for a deci-
sion that affirmed the federal district court's alleged use of a student
achievement goal to gauge the success of a remedial desegregation plan.8
Specifically, the Eighth Circuit's decision accepted the district court's use
of improved standardized test scores as a criterion to measure a school
district's compliance with a desegregation plan.9 In Jenkins, the Supreme
Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's holding and criticized its reliance on
improved test scores as a factor in determining the success of the school
district's desegregation plan.1 0 Moreover, the Court used Jenkins to
broadly address the proper scope of desegregation remedies under recent
Supreme Court precedent.
This Note discusses the circumstances in Jenkins and examines the dif-
ferent approaches courts have taken when confronted with issues concern-
ing unitary status.'1 In an effort to determine the essential components of
which no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or
color." Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per
curiam). The Supreme Court also stated that a school system achieves unitary sta-
tus when it can be described as a "nonracial system" of schools in which discrimina-
tion has been completely removed. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436
(1968). For a more in depth discussion of unitary status, see infra notes 6, 33, 61,
88, 99 and accompanying text.
6. Brown, supra note 3, at 1108. In 1968, the Supreme Court broadly men-
tioned six aspects of a school system that school districts have an affirmative duty to
desegregate to eliminate the racial identifiability of schools: student, faculty and
staff assignments, extracurricular activities, facilities and transportation. Green, 391
U.S. at 435. For a further discussion of Green, see infra notes 30-33 and accompany-
ing text. In more recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has retreated from
upholding a required set of criteria that make up unitary status; rather, the Court
directed lower courts to use the Green factors as general guidelines. See, e.g., Free-
man, 503 U.S. at 492-93 (holding that factors expressed in Green "need not be a
rigid framework" when appraising unitary status of school district); Dowel4 498 U.S.
at 250 (stating that in determining unitary status, district courts should look to
"every facet of school operations" including factors enumerated in Green). For a
further discussion of Dowell and Freeman's treatment of unitary status, see infra
notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
7. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
8. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 395-96 (8th Cir. 1994) (questioning
whether standardized test scores must improve before district court releases school
district from its supervision). For a further discussion of the Eighth Circuit's rea-
soning in Jenkins, see infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
9. Id. at 395 (noting that test scores "must be only one factor in the equa-
tion"). For a further discussion of the Eight Circuit's reasoning, see infra notes 96-
100 and accompanying text.
10. Missouri v.Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995). For a further discussion of the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Jenkins, see infra notes 111-45.
11. For a discussion of these different factors, see infra notes 31-75 and ac-
companying text.
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a unitary school district, Part II of this Note analyzes the line of desegrega-
tion cases leading to Jenkins.12 Part III discusses the long factual history
preceding the Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins.13 Part IV dissects the
majority, concurring and dissenting opinions of Jenkins and scrutinizes the
Court's reasoning in relation to prior desegregation cases. 14 Finally, Part
V considers the repercussions of Jenkins and how the Court's decision will
affect future litigation concerning school desegregation and unitary
status.
15
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court Establishes the Basis for Desegregation Remedies
The first landmark case that addressed school segregation was Brown
v. Board of Education (Brown 1).16 In Brown I, the Supreme Court decided a
case that questioned long-held opinions concerning racial classification
and states' rights.' 7 The Court held that "in the field of public education
12. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 16-76 and accompanying
text.
13. For a discussion of these facts, see infra notes 77-110 and accompanying
text.
14. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion in Jenkins, see
infra notes 111-267 and accompanying text.
15. For the definition of unitary status, see supra note 6 and infra note 33 and
accompanying text.
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. Id. at 493; see Constance Baker Motley, The Historical Setting of Brown and
Its Impact on the Supreme Court's Decision, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 9, 9 (1992) (providing
overview of Brown Iin historical context). As Motley noted, Brown Irepresents "the
first and foremost historical rectification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution." Id. Specifically, Brown Irecognized that the social policy of
segregation, upheld in the Supreme Court's opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896), violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection
under the law. Id. In Pessy, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of the south-
ern states to provide separate but equal railroad facilities for African-Americans
within their borders. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551-52. Plessy's most devastating result,
however, involved its reaffirmation that African-Americans were inherently inferior
in American society. Motley, supra, at 15. Many educational institutions in the
North, which had accepted African-Americans after the Civil War, abandoned
their private affirmative action after Plessy. Id. This abandonment demonstrated
society's treatment of African-Americans in the years between Plessy and Brown I.
Id.
Nonetheless, even before the Court's ruling in Brown I, the Court began to
move away from the doctrine of "separate but equal." See, e.g., McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (prohibiting Oklahoma from
segregating African-American male within its graduate school of education once it
had admitted him); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1950) (ordering ad-
mission of African-American to University of Texas Law School where facilities
were much superior to those at school for African-American citizens); Sipuel v.
Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948) (requiring Oklahoma to provide
legal education to African-American woman, which was already provided to Cauca-
sian students within state); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352
1398 [Vol. 40: p. 1395
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the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."1 8 Behind the Court's
holding in Brown I, existed the theory that racial segregation stigmatized
African-American children in a manner causing them to feel inferior in
American society.1 9 Brown I thus established that state-imposed segrega-
(1938) (preventing Missouri from sending African-American student out of state
to receive law school education, that Caucasian students received at home).
During the Topeka, Kansas school desegregation trial, a new theory devel-
oped for attacking the validity of segregation in education. Motley, supra, at 13;
Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 799 (D. Kan. 1951). This theory pro-
posed that state-imposed segregation had an adverse psychological effect on Afri-
can-American children's inherent ability to learn. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll
(1954). For a further discussion of the Court's finding concerning this adverse
psychological effect, see infra note 19 and accompanying text.
18. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495. Thus, Brown I specifically overruled Pessy and
articulated a reversal of Plessy's doctrine of social inferiority. See Robert L.
Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional Ghetto, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 627, 636
(arguing that Brown I represents attempt to uproot deeply entrenched racism in
American society). Furthermore, Brown Icarried a message designed to make the
Caucasian majority less convinced of its own superiority; Brown 's symbolic effect
included this message. Id.; see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY
OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
582-747 (1976) (arguing that Brown 's symbolic importance had noted affect on
American people and established societal values). Finally, as one commentator
noted, the actual impact of Brown I was enormous:
Because Brown rejected the very second-class citizenship afforded African
Americans in earlier Supreme Court cases such as Dred Scott v. Stanford
and Plessy v. Ferguson, Brown has had a profound impact on the disman-
tling of apartheid in America. In fact, it revitalized the Fourteenth
Amendment's original purpose: to help Blacks claim their right to na-
tional citizenship. Not only was Brown the authority for the prohibition of
segregation in a wide range of public activities, it provided the legal un-
derpinnings for the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE LJ. 1285, 1288
(1992); see also C. TSEHLOANE KETO, THE AFRICA-CENTERED PERSPECTIVE OF HISTORY
25-28 (1989) (noting that Brown Iprovided foundation for Civil Rights Act of 1964
and assimilation of millions of African-American citizens into American society).
19. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494. In 1950, Dr. Kenneth B. Clark submitted a study
concerning these psychological effects to the Supreme Court for its consideration
of the constitutionality of racial discrimination in public schools. SeeJohn D. Cas-
sais, Ignoring the Harm: The Supreme Court, Stigmatic Injury, and the End of School Deseg-
regation, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 259, 262-64 (1994) (discussing Clark's findings
that principle evil of school desegregation is that it stigmatizes excluded race as
inferior). Ultimately, this study was the basis for Chief Justice Warren's holding,
which stated "[t]o separate [school children] from others of similar age and quali-
fications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone." Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.
In his study, Dr. Clark specifically studied the stigmatizing effects of segrega-
tion in African-American children. KENNETH B. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD
19-24 (1955) (reprinting 1950 study adopted in Brown 1). Clark interviewed chil-
dren aged three to seven to determine their attitudes about themselves and their
race. Id. at 19. In the study, Clark used black and white dolls to demonstrate that
African-American children illustrated a conspicuous preference for the white doll.
Id. at 23. Clark concluded that this choice evidenced self-rejection on the part of
the African-American children, which he identified as stemming from their aware-
ness and acceptance of prevailing racial attitudes. Id. at 24; see alsoJOHN E. WIL-
1995] NOTE 1399
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tion unconstitutionally violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 0
A year after Brown I, Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 11)21 estab-
lished the remedial structure to enforce the holding of Brown I, focusing
on two directives.2 2 First, the Court compelled local school boards to
eliminate the existence of government-created dual school systems.2 3 Sec-
ond, the Court required school boards to implement desegregation orders
LIAMS, RACE, COLOR AND THE YOUNG CHILD 191-92 (1976) (reaching similar
conclusions in study where African-American children preferred pictures of cauca-
sian children to African-American children). More importantly, Clark also found
that segregated schools were a fundamental cause of this inferiority complex.
Clark, supra, at 33. Clark argued that Caucasian children learned of their own
superiority in school and vice versa. Id. Clark explained, "[a] child who is re-
quired to attend a segregated school is being taught that race is an important
factor in his education. It is practically impossible for him to avoid including his
appraisal of himself ... the fact of his racial identity." Id. at 32-33.
Fifteen years later, Clark further explored these findings when he studied the
effects of segregation in Harlem, New York. KENNETH B. CLARK, DARK GHETTO:
DILEMMA OF SOCIA. POWER (2d ed. 1989). In that study, Clark found that chil-
dren's IQ and academic achievement in overwhelmingly African-American inner-
city schools lagged behind that of students elsewhere in New York City and
throughout the nation. Id. at 117-25. Subsequent studies concerning segregation
and its affect on minority students' achievement illustrated similar results. See, e.g.,
Robert Dreeben & Adam Gamoran, Race, Instruction, & Learning, 51 AM. Soc. REV.
660, 661, 663 (1986) (finding significant learning disparities between African-
Americans and Caucasians due largely to inferior resources in African-American
schools). Still other studies have illustrated that African-American students'
achievement improves when those school districts implement desegregation or-
ders. See, e.g., ROBERT L. CRAIN & RITA E. MAHARD, DESEGREGATION PLANS THAT
RAISE BLACK ACHIEVEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 7-35 (1982) (finding that
desegregation resulted in increases in desegregated students' achievement, espe-
cially when desegregation began in kindergarten and first grade, and where trans-
feree schools were predominantly, but not overwhelmingly, Caucasian); ROBERT L.
CRAIN & RITA E. MAHARD, DESEGREGATION & BLACK ACHIEVEMENT 16 (1977) (con-
cluding that desegregation resulted in and would continue to increase African-
American students' achievement); Gail E. Thomas & Frank Brown, What Does Edu-
cational Research Tell Us About School Desegregation Effects ?, 13J. OF BLACK STUD. 155,
157-59 (1982) (examining studies that demonstrated improvement in African-
American students' achievement after desegregation).
20. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. See also Neal Devins, School Desegregation Law in the
1980's: The Courts'Abandonment ofBrown v. Board of Education, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 7, 14 (1984) (discussing that Brown I established basic substantive principle
that intentional segregative acts are unconstitutional under Fourteenth Amend-
ment). For a further discussion of desegregation and the Fourteenth Amendment,
see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
21. 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (Brown I1).
22. See Devins, supra note 20, at 14 (discussing Brown II's attempt to enforce
mandate of Brown 1).
23. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299. The Court held that "[s]chool authorities have
the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these [school de-
segregation] problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school
authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional
principles" established in Brown I. Id.
6
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with "all deliberate speed. '24 In addition, the Court stated that federal
district courts remained the most appropriate forum to oversee these
directives.
25
Brown I and Brown II provided the groundwork for the desegregation
movement, 26 but did not provide much advice regarding the structure of
desegregation remedies. 27 Initially, courts interpreted the "all deliberate
24. Id. at 301. For courts' interpretations of Brown ITs "all deliberate speed"
directive, see infra notes 28-30.
25. Id. at 299-300. The Court argued that district courts were the most proper
forum "[b]ecause of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for
further hearings, the courts which originally heard these [desegregation] cases can
best perform th[e] judicial appraisal." Id. at 299. The Court further held that the
district courts should have broad discretion to create remedies, stating that "[iun
fashioning and effectuating the [desegregation] decrees, the courts will be guided
by equitable principles." Id. at 300. The Court argued that this ability to shape
remedies should be "characterized by a practical flexibility," allowing the courts to
adjust for changing public and private needs. Id.; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 495
U.S. 33, 78 (1990) (recognizing that district courts have wide range of possibilities
when designing desegregation remedies); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 12 (1971) (quoting Brown Ifs holding that district courts will be
"guided by equitable principles"); Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d
1141, 1150 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that federal district courts retain jurisdiction
to modify desegregation decree to adapt its terms to changed conditions), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2998 (1993); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930,
935 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Having once found a constitutional violation, [the] district
judge... should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation ... taking into account the practicality of situation." (citing Davis v.
Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971)), affd, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Haney
v. County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 364, 369 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that Arkansas
Quality Education Act could not limit district court's power to fashion desegrega-
tion decree, which would effectuate nonracial school system). For a discussion of
the Court's subsequent interpretations of the Brown U holding, see infra notes 30-
54 and accompanying text.
26. See Cassais, supra note 19, at 267 (noting that Brown Iand Brown I "recog-
nized the inequality implicit in intentional segregation, and made it clear that the
stigmatic injury to black children caused by such segregation is the harm to be
remedied").
27. Devins, supra note 20, at 14. Devins noted that:
Aside from suggesting that Brown II remedies address "varied local school
problems," the Court remained silent on the nature and scope of the
remedies. The Court thus left unresolved the central issue whether a
school board could satisfy the Brown mandates merely by permitting black
and white students to attend previously one-race schools or whether
school districts must act affirmatively to bring together black and white
schoolchildren.... In other words, the Court left unanswered the ques-
tion whether affirmative, effect-orientated remedies would restore a
plaintiff class to the position that would exist absent unconstitutional seg-
regation or whether such affirmative relief would go too far by restructur-
ing a possibly segregated world.
Id. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted); see also Frank I. Goodman, DeFacto School Desegrega-
tion: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REv. 275, 279 (1972) (argu-
ing that Court did not address affirmative relief issue because "[n]one of the
empirical studies brought to the Court's attention.., even purported to isolate
the effects of segregation per se."). For a further discussion of the duty to affirina-
tively desegregate, see supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
1995] NOTE 1401
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speed" language of Brown /as a requirement of nondiscriminatory admis-
sions to public schools. 28 This interpretation, however, permitted school
districts to resist the original intention of the Brown decisions. 29 The
Supreme Court did not remedy this misinterpretation until 1968, when it
decided Green v. County School Board.30
In Green, the Supreme Court ruled that a freedom of choice plan in a
rural southern school district failed to satisfy the directives of the Brown
decisions.3 1 The Green Court held that school boards must come forward
28. Devins, supra note 20, at 15; see, e.g., Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683,
689 (1963) (holding that transfer program permitting students to transfer from
school where student is in racial minority to one where student is in racial majority
was insufficient because similar majority to minority program did not accompany
transfer program, allowing pupils to choose their school free of racial considera-
tions); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (holding thatfree admission of Afri-
can-American children to schools fulfilled duty to desegregate); Briggs v. Elliot,
132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (arguing that Constitution "does not require
integration. It merely forbids discrimination.").
More recently, one Supreme Court Justice echoed an argument reminiscent
of these cases. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 501 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that free choice of schools is all that Constitution requires).
29. Brian K. Landsberg, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Rehnquist Court
Revisits Green and Swann, 42 EMORY L.J. 821, 825 (1993). Landsberg noted that
"between 1955 and 1968 the Court was repeatedly called upon 'to address foot-
dragging and even defiance by school authorities." Id. Another commentator
noted that:
There is no denying that southern resistance to Brown was massive, mani-
festing itself in a variety of forms such as constitutional amendments re-
quiring school closures, substitution of private schools (with tuition
subsidies) for public schools, criminal laws forbidding school integration,
resolutions of interposition purporting to nullify the Brown decision,
NAACP harassment laws, and widespread physical violence and economic
coercion.
Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REv.
747, 807 (1991). For documentation of the Supreme Court's decisions pertaining
to these cases, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
30. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
31. Id. at 439-41. In Green v. County School Board, the school board operated
two public schools, one each on the eastern and western side of the county. Id. at
432. The two schools were racially segregated, one consisting of all African-Ameri-
can students and the other all Caucasian. Id. This segregation continued despite
the absence of any residential segregation in the rural Virginia county. Id. Fol-
lowing the Court's decision in Brown II, the school board continued to operate
segregated schools pursuant to Virginia statutes, which were enacted to resist
Brown II. Id. at 432-33. In 1965, however, after filing the original suit in Green, the
school board adopted a "freedom of choice" plan to maintain eligibility for federal
financial aid. Id. at 433. The plan permitted students, except those entering the
first and eighth grades, to choose between the county's two schools. Id. at 433-34.
The plan further held that students who did not choose a school would be as-
signed to the school they previously attended. Id. at 433. During the plan's three
years of operation, no Caucasian student chose to attend the all African-American
school, and 85% of the African-American students remained at the all African-
American school. Id. at 441.
In rejecting the school board's "freedom of choice" plan, the Court held that
the pattern of separate schools in Green, established under Virginia law, was "pre-
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with plans "that promise( ] realistically to work.., now" and further stated
that an acceptable desegregation plan must eliminate the dual school sys-
tem "at the earliest practicable date. '3 2 Moreover, the Court noted several
cisely the pattern of segregation to which Brown I and Brown II were particularly
addressed, and which Brown I declared unconstitutionally denied Negro school
children equal protection of the laws." Id. at 435. The Court further contended
that the "freedom of choice" plan ignored the "thrust of Brown I," arguing that
Brown 11 charged school districts "with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch." Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added). Although
the Court did not define "root and branch," one commentator argued that it
meant elimination of all-Caucasian and all-African-American schools. Drew S. Days
III, Comment, School Desegregation in the 1980's: Why Isn't Anybody Laughing?, 95
YALE L.J. 1737, 1746 (1986) (book review). This represents the first time the Court
used the term "unitary" in one of its desegregation decisions. Gary Orfield &
David Thronson, Dismantling Desegregation, Uncertain Gains, Unexpected Costs, 42 EM-
ORY L.J. 759, 762-63 (1993). For a further discussion of issues concerning "unitary
status," see supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 33, 61, 88, 99
and accompanying text.
32. Green, 391 U.S. at 438-39. Once again, the Court placed the affirmative
duty of desegregation on the school board. Id. at 437-38. This affirmative duty was
also recognized in subsequent cases. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 501 (1992)
(recognizing that Brown II and Green placed an affirmative duty on school districts
to desegregate); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1979)
(acknowledging that school boards have affirmative duty to take whatever steps
necessary to eliminate racial discrimination and establish unitary school system);
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 n.15 (1977) (Milliken I) (recognizing that
district courts are authorized to design plans that will "realistically work now" be-
cause ultimate objective of remedy is to make victims of unlawful conduct whole);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971) (noting that
burden is on school to come forth with workable desegregation plan that will
"work now"); Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 892 F.2d 851, 866 (10th Cir.
1989) (holding that defendant school district must demonstrate it has done every-
thing feasible to desegregate school system), vacated, 503 U.S. 978 (1992); see also
Cassais, supra note 19, at 268 (noting that "freedom of choice" plan did not suffi-
ciently fulfill school board's affirmative duty to desegregate). The Court also
noted that in determining whether the school board met the Court's original de-
segregation mandate, it was relevant to consider that the first step, adopting a
"freedom of choice" plan, happened ten years after Brown II. Green, 391 U.S. at
438. The Court argued that "[t]his deliberate perpetuation of the unconstitu-
tional dual system ... compounded the harm of such a system." Id.
Finally, the Court described the district courts' duty to assess the effectiveness
of proposed desegregation plans. Id. at 439. Recognizing a district court's discre-
tion, the Court stated:
There is no universal answer to complex problems of desegregation;
there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case. The
matter must be assessed in light of the circumstances present and the
options available in each instance.... Where the court finds the board to
be acting in good faith and the proposed plan to have real prospects for
dismantling the state-imposed dual system "at the earliest practicable
date," then the plan may be said to provide effective relief.
Id. This passage, however, has been interpreted as an attempt to narrow the vision
of Brown L See Hayman & Levit, supra note 18, at 638-39 (arguing that Green may
be read as anticipating end of court supervision).
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factors that courts should consider in an evaluation of a school district's
desegregation efforts. 33
Building on the guidelines established in Green, the Court further
clarified the duties of mandatory desegregation orders in Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.34 In Swann, the Supreme Court up-
held a federal district court's bold plan to eliminate past discrimination,
which included rearranged attendance zones and mandatory transporta-
33. Green, 391 U.S. at 435. In particular, the Court stated that the "[r]acial
identification of the system's schools was complete, extending not just to the com-
position of student bodies at the two schools but to every facet of school opera-
tions-faculty, staff transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities." Id.
(emphasis added). These "Green factors" have become the most commonly uti-
lized guides in determining whether a school system is unitary. Orfield & Thron-
son, supra note 31, at 763. Furthermore, decisions since Green have recognized
that the Green factors are interdependent. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526, 536 (1979) (noting that faculty assignment segregation is inextrica-
bly related to segregation in student assignments); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 742
F. Supp. 1275, 1291 (D. Md. 1990) (holding that Green factors are interdepen-
dent), affd sub nom., Stone v. Prince George's County Bd. of Educ., 977 F.2d 574
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1051 (1993).
34. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In 1970, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system was
the forty-third largest in the nation and included the city of Charlotte, North Caro-
lina, spanning 22 miles east-west and 36 miles north-south. Id. at 6. In the 1968-69
school year, the school system served more than 84,000 students in 107 schools. Id.
Approximately 71% of the students in these schools were Caucasian, and 29% were
African-American. Id. Two-thirds of the 21,000 African-American students who
attended schools in the entire district attended 22 schools which were either totally
African-American or more than 99% African-American in June 1969. Id. at 7.
In December 1969, the district court rejected the school board's original pro-
posals for desegregation. Id. at 8. The court subsequently selected an expert in
education to submit a new desegregation plan. Id. In February 1970, the expert,
Dr. John Finger, presented the district court with two student assignment plans:
the "Finger plan" and the "board plan." Id. at 8-10. The two plans were largely
similar, with the exception that the Finger plan treated the school system's elemen-
tary schools differently. Id. at 9. In addition to relying upon changes in geo-
graphic zoning, the Finger plan proposed the use of pairing, zoning and grouping
techniques to achieve "student bodies throughout the system ... rang[ing] from
9% to 38% Negro." Id. The district court specifically described the plan as follows:
Like the board plan, the Finger plan does as much by rezoning school
attendance lines as can reasonably be accomplished. However, unlike the
board plan, it does not stop there. It goes further and desegregates all
the rest of the elementary schools by the technique of grouping two or
three outlying schools with one black inner city school; by transporting
black students from grades one through four to the outlying white
schools; and by transporting white.students from fifth and sixth grades
from the outlying white schools to the inner city black school.
Id. at 9-10.
The district court eventually adopted the Finger plan with certain modifica-
tions. Id. at 10. The final plan provided for seven school closures with student
reassignment. Id. at 8. The plan further restructured school attendance zones to
cure racial imbalance, Id. Moreover, the plan eliminated the existing race-based
school busing system, created racially mixed administration and faculty, modified
its free-transfer plan into an option "majority-to-minority" transfer system and es-
tablished a single athletic league for all students. Id.
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tion.3 5 The Court in Swann acknowledged that school boards need not
maintain a specific level of racial balance within schools. 36 The Court con-
cluded that school districts were only required to exhibit a good faith ef-
fort to desegregate their schools and eliminate all vestiges of past
discrimination.3 7 The Court consequently acknowledged that significant
racial imbalance within a school system could exist if state-imposed segre-
gation did not cause that imbalance.3 8
Green and Swann established that school authorities must employ af-
firmative measures to eliminate vestiges of state-imposed racial segrega-
tion.3 9 Thus, the Court rejected school systems' reliance on neutral
35. Id. at 32. For a detailed description of the desegregation plan, see supra
note 34 and accompanying text. The Swann Court emphasized the established
principle that school authorities are "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to
take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." Id. at 15 (citing Green,
391 U.S. at 437-38). In addition, the Court stated that if school authorities fail to
fulfill this affirmative duty, a district court can then exercise its equitable power to
ensure that desegregation is achieved. Id. The Court noted, however, that "i] n
seeking to define ... how far this remedial power extends it is important to re-
member that judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional
violation. Remedial judicial authority does not put judges automatically in the
shoes of school authorities whose powers are plenary." Id. at 16.
The Swann Court went on to conclude that the district court's desegregation
plan fell within the court's judicial power to provide equitable relief. Id. at 30.
The Court further stated that when defining a district court's scope of remedial
power, "[s]ubstance, not semantics, must govern" the nature of the limitations
placed upon the court. Id. at 31.
36. Id. at 24, 32. Specifically, the Court held:
If we were to read the holding of the District Court to require, as a matter
of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance
or mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged
to reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not
mean that every community must always reflect the racial composition of
the school system as a whole.
Id. at 24.
37. Id. at 32. The Court wrote that once school officials make an affirmative
good faith effort to desegregate their schools, they do not have to "make year-by-
year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies." Id. at 32.
38. Id. at 31-32; see also Devins, supra note 20, at 18 (discussing potential racial
imbalances in school systems). The Court acknowledged that some of these racial
imbalances could be attributed to other forms of discrimination, but chose not to
address the specific issue in Swann. Swann, 402 U.S. at 23. The Court stated:
We do not reach in this case the question whether a showing that school
segregation is a consequence of other types of state action, without any
discriminatory action by the school authorities, is a constitutional viola-
tion requiring remedial action by a school desegregation decree. This
case does not present that question and we therefore do not decide it.
Id. One commentator argued that this aspect of the Swann decision reflected the
Court's "struggle with [its] obligation to do justice . . . and recognition of the
threat to racial order that fulfillment of that obligation clearly entailed." Hayman
& Levit, supra note 18, at 640.
39. Swann, 402 U.S. at 32; Green, 391 U.S. at 438. For a further discussion of
this affirmative duty, see supra notes 31-33, 37 and accompanying text.
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practices to remedy segregation because these practices effectively placed
the burden of desegregation on students.40
B. The Supreme Court Retreats from the Promise of the Brown Decisions
Although the Supreme Court in Green and Swann squarely placed the
affirmative duty to desegregate on school systems, subsequent decisions by
the Supreme Court manifested a gradual retreat from the constitutional
safeguards set forth in the twenty years following Brown L.41 Milliken v.
Bradley (Milliken 1)42 represents the most prominent of these cases. 43
In Milliken I, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of racially segre-
gative school construction patterns in Detroit, Michigan. 44 The Court
40. Cassais, supra note 19, at 270-71 (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 30; Green, 391
U.S. at 436). Cassais argued that Swann and Green established a remedial standard
completely consistent with the inherent effects of state-imposed school segrega-
tion. Id. at 270.
41. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 418 (1977) (Day-
ton 1) (holding that district court's remedy was not proportional to constitutional
violation); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 440 (1976) (hold-
ing that district court's yearly re-adjustment of student assignments so that minor-
ity students would never form majority of students in any school exceeded district
court's remedial grasp under Constitution); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-
45 (1974) (Milliken 1) (rejecting district court's remedy for desegregation because
remedy extended to adjacent school districts in which no intentional segregation
was shown). But see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979)
(Dayton H1) (permitting plaintiffs to establish prima facie case of segregation with-
out proving that intentionally discriminatory acts caused racially identifiable
schools); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (establishing pre-
sumption that all segregation in school district shown to be partially dejure segre-
gated is presumed to result from intentional actions of school authorities).
42. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
43. For a discussion of the Milliken Iholding, see infra notes 44-46 and accom-
panying text.
44. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 721-22. 'In Milliken I, the district court observed that
the cause of segregation in Detroit, Michigan stemmed from government and pri-
vate action. Id. at 724 (citing Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E.D. Mich.
1971)). Specifically, the district court concluded that the Detroit Board of Educa-
tion created and maintained optional attendance zones which "had the 'natural,
probable, foreseeable and actual effect' of allowing white pupils to escape identifi-
ably Negro schools." Id. at 725 (quoting Milliken, 338 F. Supp. at 587). Of the
eighty-six school districts in the Detroit metropolitan area, the racial composition
was 81% African-American and 19% Caucasian. Id. at 765 n.1 (White, J., dissent-
ing). Within the metropolitan area, the public school enrollment consisted of
64% African-American students and 34% Caucasian students-with most schools
either all-Caucasian or all-African-American. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Further,
the Court found that "[w]ith one exception ... defendant Board has never bused
white children to predominately black schools. The Board has not bused white
pupils to black schools despite the enormous amount of space available in inner-
city schools. There were 22,961 vacant seats in schools 90% or more black." Id. at
725-26 (citing Milliken, 338 F. Supp. at 588).
In accordance with these violations, the district court ordered the Detroit
Board of Education to create a desegregation plan for Detroit. Id. at 729. Further-
more, the district court ordered the State to enact a desegregation plan for the tri-
county metropolitan area encompassing Detroit. Id. In doing so, the court or-
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overruled the district court's decision that it was impossible to desegregate
the Detroit school system without. involving the suburbs, holding "there
[was] no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy."45 Thus,
the Court concluded that desegregation remedies could not extend be-
yond the district where the constitutional violation existed.4
6
dered the plan to include not only the city of Detroit, but also the surrounding
suburban districts that did not commit any constitutional violations. Id. at 729-30.
In evaluating the multi-district plan, the court held:
[It is proper for the court to consider metropolitan plans directed to-
ward the desegregation of the Detroit public schools as an alternative to
the present intra-city desegregation plans before it and, in the event that
the court finds such intra-city ,plans inadequate to desegregate such
schools, the court is of the opinion that it is required to consider a metro-
politan remedy for desegregation.
Id. at 732 (citation omitted).
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld this plan, arguing that "the
only feasible desegregation plan involves the crossing of the boundary lines be-
tween the Detroit School District and adjacent or nearby school districts for the
limited purpose of providing an effective desegregation plan." Id. at 735 (citing
Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215,,249 (6th Cir., 1973) (en banc)).
45. Id. at 745. Chief Justice, Warren Burger, writing for the majority in Mili-
ken I, held that the district court's desegregation order was overly broad and that
the desegregation remedy should be limited to the district where the constitu-
tional violation actually occurred, that is, the Detroit school district. Id. The ma-
jority wrote:
[A] n initerdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discrimina-
tory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an
adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on
the basis of race. In such circumstances an interdistrict remedy would be
appropriate to eliminate the interdistrict segregation directly caused by
the constitutional violation. Conversely, without an interdistrict violation
and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an
interdistrict remedy.
Id. Thus, the imposition of an interdistrict remedy required proof that a constitu-
tional violation exists in one district that in turn caused segregation in a neighbor-
ing district. Id.; see also Robert T. Abramson, Note, States' Rights-Minimally
Obtrusive Means Required in Imposing Desegregation Remedies Upon Local School Dis-
trict-Missouri v. Jenkins, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 387, 396-97 (1991) (noting that
Court's decision to impose multi-district remedy would alter and disrupt entire
structure of Michigan's public school system).
46. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 745. The Court explained its deference to district
boundaries: "No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than
local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought
essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public
schools and to quality of the education process." Id. at 741-42. It has been argued,
however, that "[t]he result in Milliken-that the remedy should be limited to De-
troit City public schools-was a blow to proponents favoring a more integrated
society after Brown." Bernard James & Julie M. Hoffman, Brown in State Hands:
State Policymaking and Educational Equality After Freeman v. Pitts, 20 HAs-rINGS
CONST. L.Q. 521, 531 (1993). James and Hoffman further noted that:
[A] fter Brown II, the primary obligation to provide a remedy for unlawful
segregation in schools rested with federal courts. The judges-primarily
district court judges-were supposed to fashion decrees relying on the
traditional equity power of the federal judiciary. The Court in Brown II
noted that "[iln fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will
1995] NOTE 1407
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Following the Court's decision in Milliken I, the district court ap-
proved a multi-faceted desegregation plan aimed at remedying segrega-
tion in the Detroit school system. 47 Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I/) 4 8
addressed the constitutionality of this plan.49 In Milliken II, the Supreme
Court upheld the district court's remedial educational programs for chil-
dren subjected to past acts of de jure segregation. 50 The Court main-
be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been charac-
terized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for
adjusting and reconciling public and private needs."
The position of the Milliken majority (the Justices split 5-4) was thus
difficult tojustify. It offered a stunted version ofjudicial authority after a
constitutional violation had been found because of the potentially dis-
ruptive effect multi-district orders might have on state educational
operations.
Id. (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300 (footnotes omitted)). For a further discus-
sion of the Brown II holding, see supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
47. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 270 (1977) (Milliken I]). Specifically,
the district court ordered the Detroit School Board to implement a four-part plan
to eradicate dejure segregation in the Detroit school system. Id. at 275-76. First,
the district court ordered the General Superintendent of Detroit's schools to insti-
tute a remedial reading and communications skills program. Id. at 275. The court
held that there was "no educational component more directly associated with the
process of desegregation than reading." Id. (quoting Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F.
Supp. 1096, 1138 (E.D. Mich. 1975)). Second, the court ordered the Detroit
Board of Education to establish a comprehensive in-service teacher training pro-
gram to help teachers understand the desegregation process and to ensure that all
teachers would treat students equally in a desegregated school. Id. at 275-76.
Third, the court ordered the district to administer tests in a way "free from racial,
ethnic and cultural bias." Id. at 276 (citing Milliken, 402 F. Supp. at 1142). Fourth,
the district court required that the school district hire counselors both to help with
the numerous problems arising during the changes in the school system, and to
counsel students concerning the new vocational and technical school programs
available under the desegregation plan. Id. Finally, the district court ordered the
school district and the State of Michigan to bear the cost of the four programs
equally. Id. at 277.
48. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
49. For a discussion of the underlying district court's holding pertaining to
Milliken II, see supra note 47.
50. Milliken , 433 U.S. at 279-83. This represents the first time the Court
directly addressed the question of whether federal courts could create remedial
education programs as part of school desegregation decrees. Id. at 279. The
Court noted that the general principles concerning a district court's remedial pow-
ers were well established by the Court's prior decisions. Id. In particular, the
Court emphasized the basic rule from Brown H that " [i] n fashioning and effectuat-
ing the [desegregation] decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles."
Id. at 279-80 (citing Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)). For a further discussion of
Brown II, see supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
The Court set forth three factors which federal courts must consider when
applying the Brown H equitable principles. Id. at 280-81. First, the nature of the
desegregation remedy must be consistent with the nature and scope of the consti-
tutional violation. Id. (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 16 (1971)). Second, desegregation decrees must be remedial in nature; they
"must be designed as nearly as possible 'to restore the victims of discriminatory
conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such con-
duct."' Id. (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 746). Finally, the Court held that when
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tained that the four-part remedial plan fell within the district court's
equitable power and endorsed the district court's discretion to fashion a
remedial desegregation plan for a school district.5 1
The Supreme Court's decisions in Milliken I and Milliken I limited
multi-district remedies to school districts that previously operated segre-
gated schools. 5 2 Milliken H, however, affirmed the district court's ability to
exercise broad discretion when creating remedial desegregation plans.53
This ruling held special significance because it enabled courts to employ
innovative tactics when developing strategies to desegregate school
systems.54
devising desegregation remedies, federal courts must "take into account the inter-
ests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the
Constitution." Id. at 280-81. The Court narrowed these requirements, however,
noting that if "school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations ... judicial
authority may be invoked." Id. at 281 (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 15).
51. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280. The Court stated that these remedies coin-
cided with the constitutional violation:
These specific educational remedies, although normally left to the discre-
tion of the elected school board and professional educators, were
deemed necessary to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the
position they would have enjoyed in terms of education had these four
components been provided in a nondiscriminatory manner in a school
system free from pervasive dejure racial segregation.
Id. at 282. In addition, the Court carefully noted that the remedy in Milliken I was
not a mandatory blueprint for subsequent cases. Id. at 287; see also Green v. County
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (holding that "[t] here is no universal answer to
complex problems ... ; there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every
case"). For a further discussion of Green's holding, see supra notes 30-33 and ac-
companying text.
Finally, the Court addressed the State's argument that the Eleventh Amend-
ment, which prevents damages for accrued monetary liability, precluded the dis-
trict court from holding the State liable for desegregation expenses. Milliken II,
433 U.S. at 288-89 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1974)). The
Court rejected the State's reliance upon Edelman, noting that the Court in Edelman
held that it could not seek "payment of state funds ... as a necessary consequence
of compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question determination." Id.
at 289 (citing Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668). Thus, because the desegregation plan in
Milliken 11 intended to operate "prospectively," the Eleventh Amendment did not
preclude judgment against the State. Id. at 290.
52. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 270-71; Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 745. For a further
discussion of these cases, see supra notes 42-52 and infra notes 53-54 and accompa-
nying text.
53. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 283. For a further discussion of the Court's expla-
nation of a district court's discretionary power to implement desegregation reme-
dies, see supra notes 46, 50-51 and infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
54. Id. at 287; see also Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 60-61 (1990) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (finding that district court's innovative desegregation plan did not
overstep discretionary powers granted to district courts in Milliken fl). For a fur-
ther discussion of the desegregation plan instituted in Jenkins, see infra notes 85-89
and accompanying text.
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C. The Court's Attempts to Define "Unitary Status" and to Establish Criteria to
Measure a Desegregation Plan's Success
Although the desegregation cases through Milliken II carefully de-
fined a district court's ability to design remedial desegregation plans, the
effect of a finding of unitariness remained uncertain prior to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Board of Education v. Dowel155 and Freeman v. Pitts.56
Before these'decisions, the only certainty was that a finding of unitary sta-
55. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). The desegregation -litigation in Oklahoma City be-
gan in 1961, when African-American students and their parents brought suit
against the local school board to end state-imposed segregation in their public
schools. Id. at 240. The students in Dowell succeeded in their case, but the practi-
cal implementation of the desegregation plan did not occur until 1972, when the
district court ordered the school board to adopt a "Finger plan." Dowell v. Board
of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1273-74 (W.D. Okla.), affd, 465 F.2d 1012, 1014-15
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972). This Finger plan used an "elemen-
tary school feeder system" to restructure high school attendance zones by assigning
students to. junior and senior high schools according to the elementary school
zone where they lived. Dowell, 338 F. Supp. at 1267. The plan succeeded in deseg-
regating the Oklahoma City school district, resulting in a substantially integrated
school system. Ronald F. Berestka, Jr., Recent Case, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1215,
1215-16 (1991). Upon finding that the school board successfully eliminated all
vestiges of de jure segregation, the district court granted the school board's re-
quest for unitary status and ordered the case terminated. Id. at 1216.
Nonetheless, the school board voluntarily continued to operate under the Fin-
ger plan until 1985, when students and parents filed a "Motion to Reopen Case;"
contending that the district needed a new "Student Reassignment Plan" to counter
demographic' changes in the district. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548,
1549-50 (W.D. Okla. 1985), rev'd, 795. F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
938 (1986). The district court, however, declined to reopen the case, concluding
that the school district was fully integrated. Dowell 606 F. Supp. at 1555. The
Tenth Circuit reversed, stating that finding unitariness within a district does not'
preclude a plaintiff from arguing that unitariness had been subsequently de-
stroyed. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1522. On remand, the district court terminated the
Finger plan based upon its finding of unitary status. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677
F. Supp. 1503, 1520-22 (W.D. Okla. 1987), vacated, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). The district court's decision to terminate the desegre-
gation decree was addressed in Board of Education v. Dowell 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
For a discussion of the Court's decision in this case, see infra notes 59-67 and ac-
companying text.
56. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). The Freeman case involved the desegregation decree
of the DeKalb County, Georgia School System ("DCSS"), a major suburban area of
Atlanta. Id. at 471. The DCSS was segregated for decades prior to the Supreme
Court's Brown Idecision. Id. at 471-72. The DCSS's response to Brown Iirs order to
desegregate with "all deliberate speed" was typical of many school systems. Id. at
472. Interpreting "all deliberate speed" as giving opportunity to delay desegrega-
tion, the DCSS took no affirmative steps to desegregate the DCSS until the 1966-67
school year, when the district adopted a freedom of choice plan. Id. This plan had
little-to-no effect on the segregated school system in the DCSS. Id.
After the Court's decision in Green v. New Kent County School Board, African-
American students and their parents in the DCSS filed a class action against the
school district. Id.; see Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (hold-
ing that "[t]he time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out"). The district court
subsequently entered an order approving a desegregation plan which was imple-
mented in the 1969-70 school year. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 472. This plan abolished
the freedom of choice plan and adopted a school attendance plan. Id. at 473.
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tus returned control of a school system to local school authorities.5 7 Most
notably, three difficult and unresolved questions persisted: (1) What fac-
tors constitute unitariness?; (2) What effect does a finding of unitariness
have on the burden of proof against school authorities? and (3) How
should authority be shifted to local officials?
58
In Dowel45 9 the Court stated that judicial supervision ends when the
school board "complie[s] in good faith with the desegregation decree...
This plan closed all African-American schools and reassigned their students to
other neighborhood schools. Id.
Between 1969 and 1986, limited judicial intervention occurred in the DCSS.
Id. The only substantial action occurred in 1976 when the district court ordered
the DCSS to expand its student transfer program and to reassign teachers reflect-
ing the racial balance in the school system. Id. In addition, the district court
approved a boundary line change for one elementary school attendance zone. Id.
In 1986, the petitioners in Freeman asked the district court to dismiss the ongo-
ing litigation and declare that the DCSS had achieved unitary status. Id. In analyz-
ing whether the DCSS achieved unitariness, the district court considered the
"Green factors." Id. For a further discussion of the "Green factors," see supra note 33
and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the district court also considered an addi-
tional factor: the quality of education offered to African-American and Caucasian.
students in the DCSS. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 473.
The district court concluded that the school district had achieved unitary sta-
tus with regard to student assignments, transportation, physical facilities and extra-
curricular activities. Id. at 473. Vestiges of the segregated system remained,
however, with respect to teacher and principal assignments, resource allocation
and quality of education. Id. Consequently, the district court released the DCSS
from its supervision in the categories in which it achieved unitary status but re-
tained supervision in the other categories. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the district court maintained
complete authority over the school district until it achieved unitary status in all
relevant categories. Id. at 471.
57. See United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that school board can function freely after attaining unitary status so long as it
does not purposefully discriminate); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988
(4th Cir. 1985) (same); Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 646 F.2d 925, 937 (5th
Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of
Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 808 (6th Cir. 1980) (same); Cassais, supra note 19, at 279
(noting that finding of unitariness returns school system to local school authori-
ties); see also Thomas E. Chandler, The End of School Busing? School Desegregation and
the Finding of Unitary Status, 40 OKLA. L. REv. 519, 553 (1987) (discussing how dis-
trict courts should abdicate their authority when school systems are deemed
unitary).
58. Cassais, supra note 19, at 279. For a further discussion of these specific
issues concerning unitary status, see supra notes 56-57 and infra notes 59-76 and
accompanying text. For a more general discussion of unitary status, see supra
notes 6, 33, 61, 88, 99 and accompanying text.
59. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). The Supreme Court in Dowell granted certiorari to
resolve a split of opinion between the Court of Appeals for the Fourth and Tenth
Circuits. Id. at 244.
In Riddick v. School Board, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938
(1986), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that a finding of
unitariness shifted the burden of proof regarding discriminatory intent from the
school board to the plaintiffs. Id. at 528. The Fourth Circuit further concluded
that a finding of unitariness is based upon a showing that all aspects of a school
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and the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent
practicable."60 Furthermore, the Court referred to Green's language that a
district court should consider "not only. , . student assignments, but...
'every facet of school-operations, faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curric-
ular activities and facilities"' when addressing vestiges of past discrimina-
tion.6 1 Therefore, the Court condoned the potential release of a school
system are free from vestiges of prior racial discrimination, according to the factors
established in Green. Id. at 532-33 (citing Green, 391 U.S. at 435).
The Tenth Circuit stated its contrary opinion on the issue of unitariness in
Dowell v. Board of Education, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 237
(1991). In contrast to Riddick, the Dowell court held that a desegregation decree
ordering a school system to achieve unitary status can terminate only upon show-
ing an extreme change in the school district's circumstances. Id. at 1490-91.
Thus, the disagreement between the Fourth and Tenth Circuits involved the
issue of when a school district should be released from judicial control. Dowell, 498
U.S. at 249-50. The Dowell Court ultimately remanded the case to the district court
to determine whether the school district complied with the desegregation decree.
Id. at 251. In offering guidance to the district court, however, the Court provided
several meanings of the term "unitary status." Id. at 245-50. For a further discus-
sion of the Court's holding in Dowell, see infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
60. Dowel4 498 U.S. at 249-50. Before reaching this conclusion, the Court pro-
vided various interpretations of the term "unitary." Id. at 245-46. The Court recog-
nized that different courts define the word "unitary" in different ways. Id. For
example, some lower courts use "unitary" to describe a school district that "has
completely remedied all vestiges of past discrimination." Id. at 245 (citations omit-
ted). Nevertheless, other courts use "unitary" to describe any school district that
"has currently desegregated student assignments, whether or not that status is
solely the result of a court-imposed desegregation plan." Id. (citations omitted).
Thus, the Court recognized that "a school district could be called unitary and nev-
ertheless still contain vestiges of past discrimination." Id. The Court concluded
this analysis stating:
We think it is a mistake to treat words such as "dual" and "unitary" as if
they were actually found in the Constitution. The constitutional com-
mand of the Fourteenth Amendment is that "[n]o State shall ... deny to
any person ... the equal protection of the laws." Courts have used the
terms "dual" to denote a school system which has engaged in intentional
segregation of students by race, and "unitary" to describe a school system
which has been brought into compliance with the command of the Con-
stitution. We are not sure how useful it is to define these terms more
precisely, or to create subclasses within them.
Id. at 245-46.
Following an inconclusive discussion of unitary status, the Court confronted
the substantive issue of Dowell. Id. at 246-47. In setting the standard for the with-
drawal of court supervision, the Court accentuated Brown I's original holding that
"federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary measure
to remedy past discrimination," and that desegregation orders were not intended
to "operate in perpetuity." Id. at 247-48.
61. Id. at 250 (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 435). The Court used the "Green
factors" to determine whether past discrimination was eradicated. Id. The Court
held that if these factors are satisfied, unitary status is achieved and local authori-
ties regain control of the schools. Id. In making this conclusion, the Court ac-
knowledged the importance of local control over public schools and the notion
that desegregation decrees should not extend beyond the time required to remedy
past dejure segregation. Id. at 248 (citing Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280-82 (1977)).
The Court further recognized the importance of local control over public schools
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district from court supervision, even if its schools remain segregated.6 2
Nonetheless, the Court warned that even a school district "released from
an injunction imposing a desegregation plan .... remains subject to
the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."63
Justice Marshall, writing the dissent in DoweI464 expressed concern
with the vagueness of the majority opinion.65 Justice Marshall believed
that as long as conditions of racial segregation declared unconstitutional
under Brown I persist in a school district, compliance with a desegregation
order remains incomplete. 66 Justice Marshall emphasized that the ulti-
by specifically noting that "[local control over the education of children allows
citizens to participate in decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school pro-
grams can fit local needs." Id.
62. Id. at 250.
63. Id. One question remains, however: How does the finding of unitary sta-
tus affect the burden of proof? See Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding
of Unitariness in School Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 653 (1987), which
contends that:
Allocation of the burden of proof after a finding of unitariness should
depend, as it does prior to unitariness, upon considerations of fairness
and policy in light of the probability of continued intent to discriminate.
Courts should consider the original proof of unconstitutional systemic
segregation in evaluating evidence that a dual system is being reestab-
lished and should allocate burden accordingly.
Id. at 668. Nevertheless, a more recent speculation, in light of Dowell asserted:
The clear import of Dowell is that it eliminates federal supervisory jurisdic-
tion upon a finding of unitariness. The implicit presumption is that any
segregation occurring after the determination of unitariness is de facto,
and a plaintiff must commence an entirely new suit and demonstrate
present purposeful discrimination on the part of the school board to re-
establish federal court supervision.
Hayman & Levit, supra note 18, at 647-48. Thus, it seems that the plaintiff has the
burden of proving present purposeful discrimination after a finding of unitariness.
Id.
64. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and
Stevens joined Justice Marshall's dissent.
65. Id. at 261 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was most concerned
with the majority's definition of "unitariness." Id. at 256-57 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). In Marshall's opinion, the proper analysis required taking into account "the
unique harm associated with a system of racially identifiable schools and must ex-
pressly demand the elimination of such schools." Id. at 257 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). In his criticism of the majority's definition, Marshall clung to the original
focus of Brown I, which emphasized the particular social harm that racially segre-
gated schools inflict upon African-American children. Id. (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). For a discussion of these inherent psychological harms discussed in Brown I,
see supra note 19 and accompanying text. For the majority's definition of unitari-
ness, see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
66. Id. 498 U.S. at 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated, "I
believe a desegregation decree cannot be lifted so long as conditions likely to in-
flict the stigmatic injury condemned in Brown I persist and there remain feasible
methods of eliminating such conditions." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In addition, Justice Marshall condemned the majority for equivocating the
possible re-emergence of racially identifiable schools. Id. at 263 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). In particular, Justice Marshall contended that the majority's opinion
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mate goal of a school board is to "eliminate any condition that perpetuates
the message of racial inferiority inherent in the policy of state-sponsored
segregation."
67
A year after the Dowell holding, Freeman v. Pitts68 provided the
Supreme Court with another opportunity to refine developed principles
concerning unitary status.69 Specifically, the Court decided whether a dis-
trict court can relinquish its supervision over those aspects of a school sys-
tem that comply with a desegregation order if other aspects of the system
remain in noncompliance.7 0
In Freeman, the Court held that a district court's ultimate objective is
"to remedy the [constitutional] violation and . . . restore state and local
authorities to the control of a school system." 7' The Court, exhibiting
hinted that the district court could ignore the effect of residential segregation in
perpetuating racially identifiable schools if this residential segregation is attributa-
ble to "private decisonmaking and economics." Id. at 264 (Marshall,J., dissenting)
(citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250 n.2). For a further discussion of this issue, see infra
notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 268 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
69. For the facts and procedural history of Freeman, see supra note 56 and
accompanying text. For the Court's previous discussion of unitary status, see supra
notes 55-68 and infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. For the Court's subse-
quent refinement of unitary status, see infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
70. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 485. The Court answered this question in the affirma-
tive. Id. at 489. The Court acknowledged that the discretion to incrementally with-
draw its supervision and control stemmed from the Court's holding in Pasadena
City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). Freeman, 503 U.S. at 488
(recognizing that Spangler held that district court exceeded its remedial authority
in requiring annual readjustment of school zones when changes in racial makeup
of schools were attributable to demographic shifts in community)). In recognizing
a district court's discretion to order incremental withdrawal of its supervision, the
Court listed a number of factors that should be considered when contemplating a
partial withdrawal. Id. at 491. It has been argued, however, that the Freeman
Court's reliance on Spangler was misplaced. Bradley W. Joondeph, Note, Killing
Brown Softly: The Subtle Undermining of Effective Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46
STAN. L. REv. 147, 155-56 (1993). Joondeph noted that Spangler stands for the
following three propositions:
(1) courts are limited as to the affirmative steps they can require a school
district to undertake under a desegregation order; (2) this limit is by defi-
nition the point at which the school district has eliminated all vestiges of
the unlawfully segregated system; and (3) a school system may eliminate
such vestiges sequentially, and may therefore discharge its duty to deseg-
regate in some Green areas before others.
Id. at 156. Focusing on the third factor, Joondeph contrasted Spangler and Freeman,
and noted that Spangler did not establish the principle of incremental withdrawal.
Id. at 155.
71. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489. The Court held that "[r]eturning schools to the
control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is essential to restore
their true accountability in our governmental system." Id. As one commentator
noted, however,
[t]he Court failed to mention the need to remedy the effects of the viola-
tion .... The Court's recognition of the desire for local control is not
new, but its characterization of this control as the "ultimate objective"
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substantial deference to a district court's discretionary powers, balanced
the importance of local, control when defining unitary status. 72
In attempting to clarify the requirements of unitary status, the Freeman
Court held that the factors expressed in Green need not be rigid. The
Court emphasized the appropriateness of the district court's inquiry into
the "quality of education," in addition to its evaluation of the traditional
Green factors. 73 The Court noted that the "discretion to order the incre-
makes this familiar consideration into a much heavier counterweight to
the rights of black children.
Lisa Stewart, Note, Another Skirmish in the Equal Education Battle, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rrv. 217, 224-25 (1993) (footnote omitted).
72. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 488-89. The Court concluded that the concept of
unitary status is helpful when defining the scope of a district court's authority. Id.
at 486. The Court noted, however, that unitariness is not a precise concept and
cited Dowell for the proposition that it is a mistake to treat the word unitary as if it
exists in the Constitution. Id. at 486-87 (citing Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d
1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 237, 246-47 (1991)). For a further discussion
of the Dowell Court's interpretation of unitary status, see supra note 60 and accom-
panying text. This imprecise concept of the term unitary was important for the
Court, because it wished to avoid limiting a district court's equitable discretion
within a narrow interpretation of "unitary." Id. at 487. The Court noted:
The essence of a court's equity power lies in its inherent capacity to adjust
remedies in a feasible and practical way to eliminate the conditions or
redress the injuries caused by unlawful action. Equitable remedies must
be flexible if these underlying principles are to be enforced with fairness
and precision.
Id. It has been argued, however, that Freeman effectively redefined unitary status.
See, e.g., Joondeph, supra note 70, at 160 (arguing that "in cases where the district
court withdraws supervision incrementally, Freeman implicitly elevates-the selected
Green areas to the exclusive indicia of compliance," allowing district court to declare
"the system unitary even if the school district remains segregated as measured by
other criteria"); Frank H. Stubbs, III, Note, Freeman v. Pitts: A Rethinking of Public
School Desegregation, 27 U. RicH. L. REv. 399, 411 (1993) (asserting that Freeman
Court "largely ignored a review of these intangible factors (mentioned in Justice
Marshall's dissenting opinion in Dowell] before granting unitary status to the
[DeKalb County School System]"). For a further discussion of Marshall's dissent
in Dowel, see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
73. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492. The Court ruled that the district court's consid-
eration of additional factors beyond those set forth in Green were within the court's
equitable discretion. Id. The Court also held that. this type of analysis enabled the
district court to inquire "whether minority students were being disadvantaged in
ways that required the formulation of new and further remedies to insure full com-
pliance with the court's decree." -Id. For a further discussion of Freeman's treat-
ment of the district court's exercise of discretionary powers, see supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
With regard to DeKalb County's "quality of education" programs, the majority
held that the district court should maintain jurisdiction because the school district
did not fully comply with the requirements of a unitary quality of education pro-
gram. Id. at 492. Specifically, the Court found that the district court previously
rejected contentions that racial disparities existed in educational resources (e.g.,
library books, teachers with more experience). Id. at 482-83. The Court also
found that the district court considered expert testimony concerning the overall
education program in the DCSS, as well as objective evidence of African-American
achievement indicated by African-American students' improvement on standard-
ized tests, such as the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills and the Scholastic Aptitude Test.
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mental withdrawal of its supervision in a school desegregation case must
be exercised in a manner consistent with the purposes and objectives of its
equitable power."74 Thus, while the Court in Freeman reaffirmed a district
court's ability to exercise broad discretion in desegregation cases, the
Court failed to outline the precise criteria applicable in determining
Id. at 483. Nevertheless, the district court did not ultimately grant unitary status
because "teachers in schools with disproportionately high percentages of white stu-
dents tended to be better educated and have more experience than their counter-
parts in schools with disproportionately high percentages of black students" and
because there were disparities in per pupil expenditures in racially identifiable
schools. Id. at 483.
74. Id. at 491. Among the factors that the Court listed were the following:
whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree
in those aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn;
whether retention ofjudicial control is necessary or practicable to achieve
compliance with the decree in other facets of the school system; and
whether the school district has demonstrated, to the public and to the
parents and students of the once disfavored race, its good-faith commit-
ment to the whole of the court's decree and to those provisions of the law
and the Constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention in
the first instance.
Id. The Court further instructed district courts to give special attention to a school
system's record of compliance when deciding to withdraw its supervision. Id. The
Court relied on Dowell for this notion. Id.; see Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50 (stating
that "[t] he District Court should address itself to whether the Board had complied
in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether ves-
tiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable"). For a
further discussion of the Court's holding in Dowell see supra notes 59-67 and ac-
companying text.
In discussing a district court's equitable power, the Freeman Court also men-
tioned demographic factors as a cause of segregation that was not remediable.
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 493-96. The Court deemed these to be factors of private
choices, thus presenting no constitutional implications. Id. at 495. Between 1950
and 1985, DeKalb County grew from 70,000 to 450,000 in total population. Id. at
475. More notably, in 1969, the DCSS had 5.6% African-American students; in
1986 the percentage of African-American students was 47%. Id. In addition, dur-
ing the 1970s, Caucasians predominately populated the northern half of DeKalb
County, while African-Americans settled in the southern half of the county. Id.
The Court cited these demographic changes as having a prominent effect on the
racial composition of the DCSS schools. Id.
In Freeman, these demographic factors were relevant to the Court's discussion
pertaining to a school district's "good faith" effort in eliminating vestiges of dis-
crimination. Id. at 495. In particular, the Court stated that the district court did
not have the duty to cure racially identifiable schools, stating: "Where resegrega-
tion is a product not of state action but of private choices, it does not have constitu-
tional implications." Id. The Court further stated that:
As the de jure violation becomes more remote in time and these demo-
graphic changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a current racial im-
balance in a school district is a vestige of the prior de jure system. The
causal link between current conditions and the prior violation is even
more attenuated if the school district has demonstrated its good faith.
Id. at 496. Based upon these notions, the Court upheld the district court's conclu-
sion that the DCSS had no duty to order massive expenditures to desegregate the
school system, because demographic changes caused the resegregation. Id. at 496-
97.
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unitariness. 75 This deficiency is a conspicuous element of the Court's de-
cision and it ultimately prompted confusion in federal courts, as illus-
trated by the Eighth Circuit's sharply split decision in Jenkins v. Missouri.76
III. FACTS
In 1977, the Kansas City, Missouri School District ("KCMSD") imple-
mented a desegregation plan that re-assigned students within the school
district and attempted to effect a minimum of thirty percent minority en-
rollment in every KCMSD school. 77 The plan transferred minority stu-
dents from schools with large minority enrollments to schools with low
minority enrollments and vice versa. 78 In addition, the plan changed
school boundary lines and created attendance zones; thus, more than
16,000 KCMSD students began attending new schools. 79 Despite these ef-
forts to desegregate the KCMSD, by 1985, the desegregation plan had
clearly failed.80 This failure largely resulted from "white flight"8 1 to pri-
75. Id. at 486-87. For the Freeman Court's discussion of unitariness, see supra
notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
76. 19 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1994). For a thorough analysis of the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in Jenkins, see infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
77. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 35 (W.D. Mo. 1985). Sixty-five com-
munity members chosen to represent students, parents, teachers and various Kan-
sas City groups and organizations developed this desegregation plan. Id. Prior to
the implementation of the desegregation plan, the enrollment in the Kansas City,
Missouri School District ("KCMSD") was 65.6% minority students. Id. Twenty of
the district's schools were between 30 and 80% minority, and forty-one others were
more than 80% minority. Id.
78. Id. at 35-36.
79. Id. More specifically, the desegregation plan embraced four directives.
Id. The plan (1) altered boundary lines for school assignment, (2) paired and
clustered elementary schools to integrate minority and majority students, (3) cre-
ated enlarged secondary attendance zones, allowing two-way reassignment of stu-
dents and (4) adopted innovative school zoning ordinances to further adjust
student assignment. Id.
80. Id. at 36. At that time, nineteen of the fifty elementary schools in the
KCMSD had an enrollment of 90% or more minority students. Id. Following the
desegregation plan's implementation, no KCMSD school enrolled less than 30%
minority students in grades one through twelve. Id. More specifically, the enroll-
ment in three of the eight junior high schools in the KCMSD was 90% or more
African-American, and three of the eight senior high schools had enrollments
which were 90% or more African-American. Id.
Nonetheless, during the 1979-80 school year, the United States Office of Civil
Rights identified the KCMSD as "in compliance" with federal requirements for
school desegregation under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. The 1984-
85 enrollment in the KCMSD was 36,259 total students with 68.3% African-Ameri-
can, 26.7% non-minority, 3.7% Latino and 1.3% other minority groups. Id.
81. Id. at 37. "White flight" is the mass migration of whites to suburban
schools in response to government-mandated school integration. See Wendy R.
Brown, Comment, The Convergence of Neutrality and Choice: The Limits of the State's
Affirmative Duty to Provide Equal Educational Opportunity, 60 TENN. L. REv. 63, 102-03
(1992) (finding that "[white flight] tops the list as the most enigmatic intervening
factor for which to compensate in eradicating segregated school systems"). White
flight occurs when Caucasians move out of communities in response to African-
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vate and suburban Kansas City schools.8 2
In 1985, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri addressed the failure of the KCMSD's desegregation plan in Jen-
kins v. Missouri.83 In Jenkins, the district court found that state-imposed
"[s]egregation had caused a system wide reduction in student achievement
in the schools of the KCMSD" and that the KCMSD's 1977 desegregation
plan reflects an unsuccessful attempt at curing existing segregation.
84
Pursuant to this finding, District Court Judge Clark fashioned a court-im-
posed remedial desegregation plan intended to "make the constitutional
ideal of equal justice under the law a 'living truth. ''85
Americans moving in-many times in response to desegregation efforts. Id. As
the whites move away to the suburbs, efforts to desegregate become more difficult.
Id. In past cases, the Supreme Court held that school boards could not use white
flight and the resulting change in housing patterns as ajustification for refusing to
dismantle segregated school systems. Id.; see, e.g., Johnson v. Board of Educ., 457
U.S. 52, 52 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that racial quotas purportedly designed
to prevent white flight were unlawful because they resulted in denial of admission
to some African-Americans); United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407
U.S. 484, 491 (1972) (deciding that "white flight" could not "be accepted as reason
for achieving anything less than complete uprooting of the dual public school sys-
tem"); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 539 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that "white
flight" could not be used as justification for failing or refusing to dismantle dual
school system). In a more recent Supreme Court decision, however, the Court
disallowed the use of housing discrimination and segregation to prove a state's
failure to desegregate public education. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494-95
(1992) (discharging school board from obligation to achieve racial balance be-
cause segregated housing accounted for segregated schools and attributing segre-
gated housing to "private choices"); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427
U.S. 424, 434 (1976) (holding that no constitutional right exists to particular de-
gree of racial balancing or mixing); Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717, 740-41 (1974) (stating
that desegregation, in sense of dismantling school system, does not require any
particular level of racial balance). For a further discussion of Milliken I and Free-
man, see supra notes 42-47, 68-75 and accompanying text.
82. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 36. Between 1977 and 1985 the KCMSD majority
enrollment decreased more than 44% while minority enrollment decreased only
30%. Id. at 36. Despite these statistics, the KCMSD proposed, in 1985, to continue
the existing desegregation plan. Id. The proposal promised to make appropriate
modifications in the original plan for school closing and aimed to achieve the
highest possible level of desegregation in the KCMSD schools. Id. In particular,
the proposal pledged to "reduce the percentage of black students in schools where
they represent a disproportionate share of the students (compared to the enroll-
ment of the District as a whole)." Id. The State of Missouri estimated that in order
to achieve these goals, approximately 4,270 students would need to be transferred
at a cost in excess of five million dollars. Id.
83. 639 F. Supp. at 19.
84. Id. at 24. The district court found that test results from the Iowa Test of
Basic Skills in grade one through six illustrated that there were only a few elemen-
tary schools of the fifty in the KCMSD that performed at or above the national
norm in reading and mathematics. Id. The court further found, through the testi-
mony of several expert witnesses, that achievement scores in the KCMSD would
improve if the school system had "adequate resources, sufficient staff development,
and proper teaching methods." Id.
85. Id. at 22-23 (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958)). Judge Clark
based his conclusion concerning the function of a remedial plan on a long history
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The KCMSD implemented the desegregation plan fashioned in the
district court during the 1985-86 school year.86 This plan consisted of
of case law. Id. at 23. Judge Clark continued that "[t]he basic remedial principle,
repeatedly articulated by the courts in school desegregation cases, is that 'the
scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional
violation."' Id. (quoting Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 744 (holding that federal courts may
order multi-district remedy for school desegregation only when there is finding
that all districts involved are responsible for segregation to be remedied)); see also
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 (1979) (finding that court
imposed remedy should be commensurate with violation- ascertained); Dayton I,
433 U.S. 406, 420 (1976) (noting that various types of remedial measures did not
suffice to justify system-wide remedy absent showing that such remedy was neces-
sary to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed school desegregation); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (stating that judicial
powers may be exercised only on basis of constitutional violation). Finally, Judge
Clark noted that the primary goals of any desegregation remedial plan should be
to prohibit new violations and eliminate the effects of prior constitutional viola-
tions in the school district. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 23; see also Green v. County
Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968) (holding that Constitution requires abolition of
discriminatory system and its effects); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154
(1965) (stating that "[w]e bear in mind that the court has not merely the power
but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discrimi-
natory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future"). For a
further discussion of Green, see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
In designing the desegregation plan, Judge Clark also used the language of
Brown II to guide the district court, stating that the district court should have the
flexibility to fashion an equitable remedial decree. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 23.
Judge Clark argued that this ability would allow the court to exercise practicality in
adjusting the remedy to changing public and private needs. Id. (citing Brown II,
349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)).
The court further held that the goal of any desegregation plan is clear-
"[t]he elimination of all vestiges of state imposed segregation." Id. The court
once again justified its ability to impose a broad plan stating that in achieving the
plan's goals, "the district court may use its broad equitable powers, recognizing
that these powers do have limits." Id. The court recognized that these limits re-
quire the court to remain within the scope of the constitutional violation and re-
spect the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs. Id.
Finally, the court recognized that the implementation of the desegregationplan would be complex and difficult: "'The pain of transition is an unfortunate,
but inevitable result of deliberate policies which have isolated black Americans
from the schools ... of white Americans."' Id. (quoting United States v. School
Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 546 (8th Cir.), cert denied 423 U.S. 946 (1975)).
Judge Clark's desegregation plan was designed to broadly achieve three pri-
mary goals. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 33-35, 54. First, the plan was devised to attract
majority (Caucasian) students to the KCMSD in order to provide minority students
with a multiracial educational program. Id. at 34-35. Second, the court aspired to
provide a high quality education program, whether or not a significantly desegre-
gated school population ever actually resulted. Id. at 33-34. Finally, the court
stated that its long term goal was to "make available to all KCMSD students educa-
tional opportunities equal to or greater than those presently available in the aver-
age Kansas City, Missouri metropolitan suburban school district." Id. at 54. In
addition to stating these goals, the court further held that the State of Missouri
should bear the burden of removing the vestiges of discrimination because it was
state mandated policies that originally caused segregation in Missouri's schools.
Id. at 23-24.
86. Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 398 (8th Cir. 1994).
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multiple components that strived to integrate the schools of the KCMSD
and improve student achievement.8 7 The focal point of the court's deseg-
87. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 26-56. The components of the desegregation plan
included: (1) a plan to enhance the KCMSD's school evaluation, (2) an order to
reduce elementary and secondary school class size, (3) the formation of a summer
school program, (4) the institution of full day kindergarten classes, (5) school
sponsored tutoring, (6) early childhood development programs, (7) effective
school programs, (8) staff development, (9) mandatory student reassignment and
(10) massive capital improvements within the KCMSD. Id.
The first component of the desegregation plan was designed to enhance the
KCMSD's school evaluations. Id. at 26. The Missouri State Department Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education's (DESE) highest classification was "AAA." Id. This
rating designates that a school system quantitatively and qualitatively has the neces-
sary resources to provide a rudimentary education to its students. Id. From 1977-
85, the KCMSD had a quality rating of "AA," while all other school districts in the
Kansas City area were rated "AAA." Id. The court justified this component, stating
that "[t]he patrons of [the] school district, especially the parents of potential stu-
dents of that school district, view a AAA rating as an important factor in measuring
the school's ability to educate its students." Id. at 27. The court noted that the
KCMSD's eligibility for a "AAA" rating was dependent on its improvement in li-
brary resources, specialty teachers, additional student counselors and increased
planning time for elementary school teachers. Id. at 26-27. In particular, the court
marked three areas to improve to achieve a "AAA" rating from the DESE. Id. at 26-
28. First, the court ordered the KCMSD to hire additional librarians and to make
expenditures on library and media resources. Id. at 26. Second, the court ordered
the KCMSD to allow more planning time for teachers during the school day and
further ordered the district to hire additional specialty teachers to teach art, physi-
cal education and music courses. Id. at 27. In addition, the court required the
district to hire thirty-one each of new certified teachers and teacher's aids to insure
that teachers were not overworked. Id. Third, the court ordered the KCMSD to
hire eighteen school counselors to comply with the "AAA" standard for elementary
and secondary level standards. Id. Finally, the court decreed that the KCMSD and
the State of Missouri would equally bear the maximum cost for achieving "AAA"
status, $4,738,500. Id. at 28. The KCMSD was eventually awarded the "AAA" rating
in 1987-88 school year and since that time has "maintained and greatly exceeded
AAA requirements." Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 401 (Beam, J., dissenting).
The second component of the district court's desegregation plan aimed to
reduce the size of elementary and secondary school classes. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at
28-30. This component aspired to increase individual attention for lower achiev-
ing students and decrease teaching loads for teachers so that classes did not get
"bogged down." Id. The court thus implemented the following maximum class
sizes in the KCMSD schools: no more than twenty-two students in kindergarten
through third grade, no more than twenty-seven students in grades four through
six and on the secondary level, no more than 125 students per teacher per day. Id.
at 30. The court described these class sizes as minimum goals and contended that
the ideal goal would be classes of twenty or less students. Id. The court stated that
the total costs for these changes were not to exceed $12,000,000 and that the State
of Missouri was solely responsible for this amount. Id.
The third component of the district court's desegregation plan was the imple-
mentation of a summer school program. Id. This summer program was designed
to achieve three basic goals. Id. at 30-31. First, it sought to provide remedial and
developmental learning experiences for students in the elementary and secondary
education levels. Id. Second, it sought to provide reinforcement and enrichment
for secondary students. Id. at 31. Third, it sought to provide a desegregated learn-
ing experience at both the elementary and secondary school levels. Id. The dis-
trict court viewed the summer program as an opportunity to improve academic
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achievement through an expansion in the amount of learning time available to
students within the KCMSD. Id.. The total cost of this program, $745,000, was
divided equally between the KCMSD and the State of Missouri. Id.
The fourth component of the district court's desegregation plan was the im-
plementation of a full day kindergarten. Id. Under the plan, full day kindergarten
was proposed in KCMSD schools that did not already have such programs. Id. In
accordance with these expanded kindergarten programs, the court further or-
dered the KCMSD to hire an additional thirty-nine certified kindergarten teachers.
Id. The total cost of these programs, $1,092,000, was borne equally by the KCMSD
and the State of Missouri. Id. at 32.
The fifth component of the district court's desegregation plan was an "effec-
tive school" program designed to improve local involvement throughout the
KCMSD. Id. at 33. This program earmarked funds that various school committees
could use to help students further improve academic achievement. Id. at 34.
The sixth component of the district court's desegregation plan was staff devel-
opment. Id. at 35. This development component fashioned to provide training to
administrative personnel and teachers on the goals and principles of desegrega-
tion, the implementation of effective instructional programs, effective methods for
communicating these goals to parents and the community and methods aimed to
assist the KCMSD staff in the desegregation effort. Id. These staff development
programs were ordered to take place after school, on weekends and during the
summer with a fund of $500,000 provided for payment of stipends. Id. The State
of Missouri provided the $500,000 to the KCMSD. Id.
The seventh component of the district court's desegregation plan was
designed to implement mandatory student reassignment. Id. The court, citing
"white flight" as "no excuse for school officials to avoid the implementation of a
reasonable desegregation plan [,]" recognized that further mandatory student reas-
signment would increase the instability of the KCMSD and reduce the potential for
desegregation. Id. at 37-38 (citing Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459
(1968)). The court thus avoided implementing additional reassignment orders
and instead ordered a study into the feasibility of reducing the percentage of Afri-
can-American students in the twenty-five schools where enrollment remained 90%
or more African-American. Id. at 38.
The eighth component of the district court's desegregation plan aimed to
accomplish increased voluntary interdistrict transfers through cooperation with
other districts in the Kansas City area. Id. at 38. In addition, the court ordered the
state to pay the transportation and costs of any KCMSD African-American students
who wished to transfer from a school within the KCMSD where their race was in
the majority to another school in the Kansas City area where their race was a mi-
nority. Id. at 39. Further, the state was ordered to pay the same costs for any non-
minority student living in other school districts who wished to transfer to a KCMSD
school with a minority enrollment greater than 50%. Id.
The ninth component of the district court's desegregation plan directed mas-
sive capital improvements throughout the KCMSD. Id. The court held that the
condition of sixty-eight school facilities in the KCMSD "adversely affect[ed] the
learning environment and serve[ed] to discourage parents who might otherwise
enroll their children in the KCMSD." Id. The court went on to list the long inven-
tory of problems with KCMSD schools, from faulty heating systems to crumbling
playground equipment. Id. at 39-40. Noting that the improvement of these facili-
ties was an important factor in the success of a desegregation plan, the court or-
dered the KCMSD to submit a $37,000,000 capital improvements plan aimed to
achieve three directives: (1) eliminating safety and health hazards, (2) correcting
conditions that impeded the comfort needed for a good learning climate and (3)
improving facilities to make them visually attractive. Id. at 41. The court assigned
the cost of these improvements to the State of Missouri. Id.
Finally, the district court's desegregation plan formed a central committee to
help administer the massive desegregation effort. Id. at 41-43. Consequently, the
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regation plan, however, involved the creation of "magnet schools."88
These magnet schools attempted to attract both majority (Caucasian) and
minority (African-American) students from Kansas City's suburbs and aug-
ment educational opportunities for all students in the KCMSD.8 9
In the years that followed the court-implemented desegregation plan,
the district court approved further requests to magnetize all high and mid-
dle schools. 90 The district court also approved a massive capital improve-
district court selected members for a Monitoring Committee to oversee the imple-
mentation of the plan. Id. at 42. This Committee consisted of ten members: four
African-Americans, four Caucasians and two Latinos. Id. This Committee was fur-
ther broken down into subcommittees, which were responsible for overseeing spe-
cific aspects of the desegregation plan. Id.
88. Id. at 34. Magnet schools are traditionally thought of as one of the most
effective desegregation methods. Kimberly C. West, Note, A Desegregation Tool That
Backfired: Magnet Schools and Classroom Segregation, 103 YALE L.J. 2567, 2567 (1994).
In addition, magnet schools are presently used extensively as part of court-ordered
desegregation plans throughout the United States. See Janet R. Price & Jane R.
Stern, Comment, Magnet Schools as a Strategy for Segregation and School Reform, 5 YALE
L. POL'Y REV. 291, 294 n.5 (1987) (identifying Jenkins as "the most recent example
of a court-ordered plan involving extensive use of magnets"). Typically, magnet
schools offer a special curriculum aimed at drawing students of different racial
backgrounds. West, supra, at 2567.
One study conducted in Montgomery County, Maryland, found that:
The magnet programs leave the racial composition of the nonmagnet stu-
dents' classes largely unaffected. This is because the schedule of special-
ized magnet courses limits the number of opportunities for sharing
classes with the rest of the student body. Where magnet and nonmagnet
students do not mix in the classroom, they are mostly in classes with other
high-achieving students and relatively more [Caucasian] students.
MAGNET SCHOOL.POLICY STUDIES AND EvALUATIONs, 261, 265 (Donald R. Waldrup
et al. eds., 1993). Thus, the magnet programs often resulted in overall integration.
This result is not limited to Montgomery County, Maryland. For example, in
1987, Maton Elementary Schools in Perine, Florida had "one of the most successful
magnet programs in [Dade] County." Lourdes Fernandez, Housing Foils School De-
segregation, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 5, 1987, at 18. In the Perine school, the building
was desegregated-52% African-American, 38% Caucasian and 10% Latino-but
in the classrooms outside of one magnet program, 75% of the fifth and sixth grad-
ers were African-American, and 95% of the kindergartners were African-American.
Id.
89. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 34, 53-54. The district court viewed magnet
schools as a way to expand the "desegregative educational experience for KCMSD
students." Id. at 53. The district court noted that a key to the success of the mag-
net program was the commitment of the Board of Education, the superintendent,
the administration, the staff of the schools and the parents and patrons. Id. The
court held that this commitment, "when coupled with quality planning and suffi-
cient resources can result in the establishment of magnet schools which can attract
non-minority enrollment as well as be an integral part of district-wide improved
student achievement." Id. at 53-54.
The specifics of the KCMSD magnet program included the institution of fully
magnetized school programs throughout the KCMSD, which consisted of smaller
class sizes, quality educational opportunities and increased individual student at-
tention. Id. at 54. The total operating budget for these magnet schools of
$12,972,727 was divided between the KCMSD and the State of Missouri. Id. at 55.
90. Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 40 (1990). Specifically, the district court
endorsed a marked expansion of the magnet school program in 1986. Id. The
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ments program. 9 1 The district court noted that these wide-ranging
remedies provided the KCMSD with facilities and opportunities not avail-
able anywhere in the country.
92
court adopted a KCMSD proposal that every high school, middle school and half
of the elementary schools in the KCMSD become magnet schools by the 1991-92
school year. Id. This expansion included the addition of a performing arts middle
and high school, a technical school and a $32,000,000 dual-theme high school for
computer and Classical Greek Style. education. Id. The court also approved the
KCMSD's proposed budget of $142,736,025 for implementation of the magnet
program, as well as the expenditure of $52,858,301 for additional capital improve-
ments. Id.
Following these expenditures, in 1987, the district court adopted a plan re-
quiring $187,450,334 in further capital improvements. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F.
Supp. 400, 408 (W.D. Mo. 1987). At the same time, the district court accepted the
KCMSD's argument that it had "exhausted all available means of raising additional
revenue." Id. at 411. The district court, finding itself with "no alternative but to
impose tax measures which will enable KCMSD to meet its share of the cost of the
desegregation plan," and contending that the "United States Supreme Court has
stated that a tax may be increased if 'necessary to raise funds adequate to ...
operate and maintain without racial discrimination a public school system,"' or-
dered the KCMSD property tax level raised from $2.05 to $4.00 per $100 of as-
sessed valuation through the 1991-92 fiscal year. Id. at 412-13 (quoting Griffin v.
School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964)). The United
States Supreme Court eventually upheld this tax increase. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at
33 (holding that tax increase for educational purposes did not exceed equitable
powers of district court).
91. Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. at 402. In approving the KCMSD's request for these
expenditures, the district court noted that "[t]he KCMSD facilities still have nu-
merous health and safety hazards, educational environment hazards, functional
impairments, and appearance impairments." Id. at 403. The court attributed
these conditions to remaining vestiges of state-imposed segregation, contending
that "the State of Missouri by its constitutional violations and subsequent failure to
affirmatively act to remove the vestiges of the dual school system certainly contrib-
uted to an atmosphere which prevented the KCMSD from raising the funds to
maintain its schools." Id. Consequently, the court noted that a long-range capital
improvement plan was essential to the overall success of the continuing desegrega-
tion plan. Id.
The district subsequently approved the KCMSD's long-range capital improve-
ment plan, which broadly called for the renovation of approximately fifty-five
schools, the closure of eighteen facilities and the construction of seventeen new
schools by 1996. Id. at 405. More specifically, the improvement plan provided for
the expansion of certain classrooms, new athletic facilities, learning resource cen-
ters, cafeterias, art and music rooms and administrative areas. Id. at 406. Finally,
the plan included funding for the construction of specialized facilities needed for
the implementation of the long-range magnet school plan "crucial to the success
of the Court's total desegregation plan." Id.
The Kansas City Technical Center provides an example of these specialized
facilities. Id. This Center, a four year vocational and technical magnet high
school, was designed to prepare students for either college, entry level employ-
ment or both. Id. This magnet school proposed to offer programs ranging from
cosmetology to robotics. Id. For a general discussion of magnet schools, see supra
note 88 and accompanying text.
- 92. Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. July 30, 1993) (order
granting extension of desegregation plan).
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In early 1992, the KCMSD presented the district court with its pro-
posed budget for the eighth year of the desegregation plan.93 In re-
sponse, the state of Missouri lodged numerous objections to the budget
and argued that the KCMSD deserved unitary status in the "high-quality
education" aspect of the desegregation plan.94 Despite these arguments,
the district court did not make any findings on the unitary status question
and approved the budget, which included new goals for a "Long Range
Magnet Program."95 Following these findings, the State appealed the dis-
trict court's order to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.9 6 The State
contended that current quality education programs had achieved unitary
status and that the district court erred in ordering further programs.
9 7
93. Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 400 (8th Cir. 1994). The court-approved
budget for the 1992-93 school year was $54,592,191. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, No.
77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. June 17, 1992) (order approving KCMSD budget for
1992-93 school year). This budget included funding for the continuation of the
school desegregation plan's fundamental components. Id. For a further discus-
sion of these components, see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
94. Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 400. Specifically, the state relied upon Freeman v. Pitts,
503 U.S. 467 (1992), claiming that the KCMSD had achieved partial unitary status
with respect to the "high-quality education program." Id. For a further discussion
of the State's arguments, see infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. For a fur-
ther discussion of Freeman, see supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of unitary status, see supra notes 6, 33, 61, 88 and infra note 99
and accompanying text.
95. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo.June 17, 1993) (or-
der affirming KCMSD's proposed budget for 1992-93 school year). Although the
district court did not directly address the State's request for a declaration of
unitariness in the June 17, 1992 Order, the district court alluded to the State's
request in three subsequent orders. Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 400. First, on April 16,
1993, the court approved additional funding for magnet schools and directed the
KCMSD to submit further financing proposals. Id.; seeJenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-
0420-CV-W-4 at 9-13 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 1993) (order approving additional magnet
school funding). As part of this order, the court found that while the educational
opportunities in the magnet schools were better than previously available and had
successfully gained the interest of many majority students, the KCMSD could not
be declared partially unitary because academic achievement was still at or below
national norms for many grade levels. Id. at 9-13. Second, on June 30, 1993, the
district court approved a contested salary order and thus effectively denied the
State's request for a declaration of unitariness. Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 400; seeJenkins v.
Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 at 4 (W.D. Mo. June 30, 1993) (order approving
salary increases in KCMSD). Finally, on July 30, 1993, the court held in part that
"it would be wholly inappropriate to deem the KCMSD unitary or partially unitary
at this time." Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 400; seeJenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, at
4 (W.D. Mo. July 30, 1993).
96. Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993). The State appealed several
issues to the Eighth Circuit, including the State's mandatory assumption of costs
for "flagship magnets." Id. at 758. This Note, however, focuses exclusively on the
State's contention that the KCMSD schools had achieved partial unitary status.
This issue determines the State's responsibility for desegregation costs and invokes
many of the State's other arguments which raise the same issues.
97. Id. at 760-63. Specifically, the State argued that the district court erred as
a matter of law when it failed to address the State's request for partial unitary status
in theJune 17, 1992 Order. Id. at 760. For a discussion of the June 17, 1992 order,
see supra note 95. The State further argued even if the district court did not issue
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The Eighth Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed the district
court's orders, holding that the district court correctly observed that the
implementation of quality education programs, alone, did not achieve uni-
tary status.9 8 Rather, the Eighth Circuit argued, the proper test hinges on
whether the plan eliminates the vestiges of segregation to the greatest ex-
tent practicable.99 In particular, the court noted that the success of the
quality education programs must be measured by their effect on the stu-
dents. Further, the court held that it would take time to "remedy the sys-
tem-wide reduction in student achievement in the KCMSD schools."100
Following the Eighth Circuit's decision, the State appealed for a re-
hearing en banc.' 0 1 In denying rehearing, the Eighth Circuit addressed
findings of fact regarding the unitary status of the KCMSD, the district court
abused its discretion when it held that the quality education programs as not uni-
tary. Id. at 762.
98. Id. at 760-66. The Eighth Circuit first held that the district court did not
err when it failed to articulate its reasoning for not addressing the unitary issue in
the June 17, 1992 Order. Id. at 760-61. The court supported this reasoning, con-
tending that "[rfejection of the State's argument is demonstrated by the district
court's failure to make findings based on these arguments." Id. at 761; see also
Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39, 45 (7th Cir. 1961) ("[F]ailure to enter
findings with respect [to certain evidence] is tantamount to findings adverse to
appellants upon the evidence."), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 851 (1962). In addition to
these arguments, the Eighth Circuit also referred to the district court's subsequent
orders to illustrate that the district court considered and rejected the State's argu-
ment concerning partial unitary status. Jenkins, 11 F.3d at 761. For a further dis-
cussion of these subsequent orders, see supra note 95.
After addressing the first prong of the State's argument, the Eighth Circuit
turned to the State's argument that the district court abused its discretion when it
held the quality education programs were not unitary. Id. at 762. The Court re-jected this argument. Id. at 763-66. The Eighth Circuit held that to determine
whether the KCMSD had achieved unitary status, the court must consider the "con-
stitutional injury, the methods selected to remedy that injury, the goals of the rem-
edy, and the success achieved by the remedy in eliminating the vestiges of the
constitutional violations to the extent practicable." Id. at 764. The court, in ad-
dressing these questions, noted that the injuries in the KCMSD involved the re-
maining vestiges of a dual school system, which take the form of reduced student
achievement and white flight, which in turn caused a racially isolated school district.
Id. at 764 (emphasis added). The court argued that these injuries had not yet
been cured, holding that the "success of quality of education programs must be
measured by their effect on the students, particularly those who have been the
victims of segregation." Id. at 766.
99. Id. at 765-66. The court noted that "[t]he only evidence before the dis-
trict court with respect to the degree of progress on elimination of vestiges of past
discrimination was at best that a start had been made." Id. at 765. The court fur-
ther held that this evidence fell far short of establishing that such vestiges had
been eliminated to the extent practicable. Id. According to the court, these tests,
explained in Freeman v. Pills and Board of Education v. Dowell, answered the State's
argument that establishment of quality education programs fulfills the require-
ments for unitary status. Id. For a further discussion of Dowell and Freeman, see
supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
100. Id. at 766. The Eighth Circuit noted that the district court's orders re-
flected an awareness of this fact. Id.
101. Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1994). In its appeal for rehear-
ing, the State presented the same arguments as in the previous case, but added an
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whether the district court adopted a student achievement goal, using stan-
dardized test scores as the only basis for determining whether the plan
remedied past discrimination. 10 2 A sharply divided Eighth Circuit denied
the State's request for rehearing en banc, holding that the district court's
order did not indicate that it had considered only test results in denying
the State's application for unitary status.1 03 Furthermore, the majority in
Jenkins argued that its holding coincided with the original goal of the dis-
trict court, which involved remedying serious and pervasive constitutional
violations causing a system-wide., reduction in student achievement in
KCMSD schools. 10
4
The dissent in Jenkins conceded that academic improvement in the
KCMSD had been "less than dramatic" since the district court initiated the
desegregation plan in 1985.105 Nonetheless, Judge Beam, writing for the
important argument concerning the district court's use of a "student achievement
goal." Brief for Appellant at 13, Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1994)
(Nos. 90-2238, 91-3636, 92-3194, 92-3200, 93-3274). For a further discussion of the
State's original arguments, see supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
102. Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 395. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's adjudica-
tion of this issue, see supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
103. Id. at 396; seeJenkins, 11 F.3d at 766 (stating that "success of quality of
education programs must be measured by their effect on the students, particularly
those who have the been victims of segregation"). Writing for the Eighth Circuit
majority, Senior CircuitJudge Gibson immediately sought to assail the lengthy dis-
sent, which concluded that test scores were adopted as the only basis for determin-
ing the remedy of past discrimination. The majority countered this contention,.
arguing that within the realm of quality education programs, test scores must be
considered a relevant factor in the equation when deciding whether to relieve a
school district of'judicial supervision. Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 395.
104. Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 395-96 (citing Missouri v.Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24
(W.D. Mo. 1985)). For a further discussion of the original goals of the district
court in Jenkins, see supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text. The Eighth Circuit
in Jenkins relied heavily on the Supreme Court's ruling in Freeman v. Pitts. Id. at
396. In particular, the majority referred to the portion of Freeman addressing qual-
ity education programs in the local school district. Id. Freeman had held that the
school district did not achieve unitary status with respect to these programs. Id.
(citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 482-83 (1992)). For a further discussion of
the quality education program in Freeman, see supra note 56. The court further
relied on Freeman for the principle that school districts must eliminate vestiges of
discrimination to the extent practicable. Id. at 396 (citing Freeman, 503 U.S. at
498). For a further discussion of this aspect of.Freeman, see supra note 55 and
accompanying text. The majority used these principles to refute the position of
the dissent that the Constitution does not guarantee a particular level of educa-
tion. Id. Finally, the Eighth Circuit majority justified the district court's holding,
referring to its prior support of judicial discretion in desegregation cases: "The
choice of remedies to redress racial discrimination is a 'balancing process left,
within appropriate constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of the
trial court."' Id. (quotingJenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1299 (8th Cir. 1988)).
The court also noted that Freeman advocated this rationale, which supported a dis-
trict court's discretion to order an incremental withdrawal of its supervision. Id. For
a further discussion of Freeman's discussion concerning a district court's ability to
incrementally withdrawal its supervision, see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying
text.
105. Id. at 401 (Beam, J., dissenting).
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dissent, argued that the district court, through its approval of the eighth
year budget, "imbedded a student achievement goal measured by annual
standardized tests into its test of whether the KCMSD has built a high-
quality educational system sufficient to remedy past discrimination."1 0 6
Judge Beam concluded that victims of discrimination may be guaranteed
equal opportunity within high-quality educational programs, but never to
levels of educational achievement under particular circumstances. 10 7
106. Id. at 400 (Beam,J., dissenting). The dissent conceded that whether the
KCMSD actually achieved unitary status with respect to its quality education pro-
grams remained an open question. Id. (Beam, J., dissenting). However, the dis-
sent argued that imbedding a student achievement goal "creates a hurdle to the
withdrawal of judicial intervention from public education that has no support in
the law." Id. (Beam, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Judge Beam questioned
whether the goals of the original desegregation plan had been achieved. Id. at 402
(Beam, J., dissenting). To help illustrate Judge Beam's perspective on this issue,
his comments in a footnote are illuminating. Beam stated:
Although the magnet schools and several other innovative programs are
part of the enhanced educational system in the KCMSD and are part of
the calculus which must now be considered in deciding unitary status in
this case, I do not agree that the novel and expensive undertakings in
Kansas City are a necessary part of a constitutionally sufficient effort, even
one designed to eradicate the vestiges of discrimination. While Milliken II
validated compensatory and remedial programs designed to, over time,
free a public school system from the effects of de jure racial segregation,
something much less than the present Kansas City program would clearly
pass constitutional muster.
Id. at 402 n.5 (Beam,J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The dissent continued that
the stated remedial goal involved providing the KCMSD schools with educational
programs comparable to those in the suburban Kansas City school districts. Id.
(Beam,J., dissenting) (citingJenkins, 855 F.2d at 1301). An "AAA" rating indicated
achievement of this goal. Id. (Beam, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the
evidence clearly established that this goal "has long since been greatly exceeded
and can now be easily maintained without many of the present activities." Id.
(Beam, J., dissenting).
In examining this question, Judge Beam argued that education does not con-
stitute a right afforded explicit protection under the Constitution and that Swann
disclaimed any right to specific degrees of racial balance in schools. Id. at 402
(Beam, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Beam,J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The dissent contended that
the Constitution does not require such a level of achievement and furthermore,
that student achievement does not set the standard for determining partial unitary
status. Id. at 404 (Beam, J., dissenting). Judge Beam further argued that requiring
standardized test scores to reach a certain level would force a school system to be
responsible for demographic factors such as segregated housing patterns, poverty,
street violence, drug usage, criminal activity and lack of parental involvement. Id.
at 403 (Beam, J., dissenting).
Judge Beam cited an Omaha, Nebraska case analogous to the circumstances
in Jenkins. Id. (Beam, J., dissenting). In the Omaha case, the court declared a
school district unitary after it satisfied the directives of a court ordered desegrega-
tion plan. Id. (Beam, J., dissenting). After the declaration of unitary status, how-
ever, the district court discovered a gap in mathematic achievement between
minority and majority students. Id. (Beam,J., dissenting). Judge Beam quoted the
testimony of a social worker in the case who stated: "If any plan to close the mathe-
matics proficiency gap [in Omaha] is to succeed .... it must address the fact that
many of the 15,000 babies who will be born in the Omaha area this year will be
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Ultimately, the dissent concluded that it could not decide, without
further information, that the KCMSD's quality education programs were
unitary.' 08 The dissent explained, however, that when the district court
addressed the State's request for a declaration of unitary status, it adopted
a measure, standardized test results, which the Constitution did not re-
quire or permit.10 9 This component of the district court's decision pro-
vided the basis for the dissent's willingness to rehear the court's earlier
decision en banc. 110
born out of wedlock to teen-age mothers." Id. (Beam, J., dissenting) (citing Har-
old W. Anderson, Fundamental Lesson in Math Proficiency, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Feb. 13, 1994, at 19-A). Judge Beam contended that these factors exceed a school
district's control and therefore should not be considered when judging the success
of a desegregation plan. Id. at 403. (Beam, J., dissenting). Judge Beam further
asserted that using test results to appraise a desegregation order's success goes well
beyond the "practicality and requirements of the Constitution." Id. (Beam, J.,
dissenting).
Finally, the dissent in Jenkins relied on Freeman v. Pitts for the argument that
the quality of education programs in the KCMSD are unitary. Id. at 403 (Beam, J.,
dissenting). The dissent argued that the Supreme Court in Freeman did not ad-
dress whether quality of education is one of the factors that must be free from
racial discrimination prior to a declaration of unitary status. Id. (Beam,J., dissent-
ing) (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992)). For a further discussion of
Freeman, see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
The dissent explained that although the Freeman court addressed scores on
several standardized tests, the minority students in Freeman did very well on these
tests. Id. at 403 (Beam, J., dissenting) (citing Freeman, 503 U.S. at 483). Nonethe-
less, the dissent argued that the Freeman district court found that specific quality
education programs concerning teacher qualifications, library books and other ed-
ucational resources were not yet in place. Id. (Beam, J., dissenting). For a further
discussion of Freeman's quality of education programs, see supra note 56 and ac-
companying text. The dissent contended that a lack of educational expectations,
not test score results, motivated the district court in deciding Freeman. Id. at 403
(Beam,J., dissenting). For a further discussion of the Freeman Court's discussion of
these factors, see supra note 56.
In applying this analysis to the situation in Jenkins, the dissent explained that
the KCMSD offers more educational opportunity than any other school district in
America. Id. (Beam, J., dissenting). The dissent further urged the majority to re-
member that the standard established in Dowell for returning a district to local
control is "whether the vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to
the extent practicable." Id. (Beam, J., dissenting) (citing Dowell v. Board of Educ.,
498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991)). The dissent argued that the words "to the extent
praCticable" were lost in the majority's opinion. Id. (Beam, J., dissenting). For a
rther discussion of Dowell, see supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
Finally, the dissent echoed'the words of Justice Kennedy in Freeman:
Returning schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest practi-
cable date is essential to restore their true accountability in our govern-
mental system . . . . It is the duty of the State and its subdivisions to
ensure that [the effects of de jure segregation] do not shape or control
the policies of its school systems. Where control lies, so too does
responsibility.
Id. (Beam, J., dissenting) (citing Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490).
108. Id. at 404 (Beam, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Beam, J, dissenting).
110. Id. (Beam,J., dissenting). The dissent, however, offered a warning to the
State of Missouri, stating:
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IV. ANALYSIS: MssoUv v _JNvKNS
A. Narrative Analysis: The Supreme Court Explores the Practicality of the
KCMSD Desegregation Remedy and Student Achievement Goal
The Supreme Court in Jenkins granted certiorari to consider two fun-
damental issues: (1) whether the district court exceeded its constitutional
authority when it granted salary increases to virtually all the KCMSD's em-
ployees, and (2) whether the district court properly relied upon student
achievement test scores in determining the unitary status of the KCMSD's
quality education program.1 11 In answering these questions, the Court de-
cided whether the district court's desegregation remedy fell within the
constitutional boundaries explained in the Court's progeny of desegrega-
tion cases.
1. The Majority Opinion: Rejecting the District Court's Desegregation Plan as
an "Interdistrict Remedy"
The Court's opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, first addressed the
Court's ability to review the scope of the district court remedy, despite its
denial of certiorari for the same issue in 1990.112 The Court concluded
that no unfairness or imprudence occurred in deciding issues previously
before the Court when properly briefed and relevant to the present con-
If the state's claim carries with it the unstated idea that having put the
elements of a quality education program in place it may now take its
money and exit, stage left, leaving the KCMSD to finish the scene alone, I
believe that partial unitary status is not at hand. But, if an equal opportu-
nity to receive a quality education is now permanently available to each
student in the KCMSD... then unitary status has been reached and con-
trol should be relinquished by the federal courts to the state and local
governments.
Id. (Beam, J., dissenting).
111. Missouri v.Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 41 (1995).
112. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2047 (1995). In 1988, the Court
failed to grant certiorari on the State's challenge to the district court's remedial
authority. Missouri v. Jenkins, 490 U.S. 1034 (1988). -In Jenkins, however, the
Court stated that a challenge to the scope of the district court's remedy was fairly
included within the questions presented. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2047. The Court
justified this decision by contending that the questions presented for review were
inextricably related to the desegregation remedy as a whole. Id. at 2047-48 (citing
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551-52 n.5 (1980) (opinion of Stewart,
J.) ("Where the determination of a question 'isessential to the correct disposition
of the other issues in the case, we shall treat it as 'fairly comprised' by the questions
presented in the petition for certiorari."')).
Justice Souter, writing for the dissent in Jenkins, argued that the Court's deci-
sion to review the entire scope of the district court's remedy was unfair and impru-
dent. Id. at 2073-74 (Souter, J., dissenting). In essence, Justice Souter argued that
the Court did not indicate or give proper "warning" that it would address the con-
stitutionality of the entire remedy. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). For a complete dis-
cussion of Justice Souter's dissenting opinion, see infra notes 181-213 and
accompanying text.
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troversy.113 Justice Rehnquist believed that the Court needed to analyze
the district court's desegregation plan to determine whether the district
court's approval of salary increases exceeded the district court's remedial
authority. 114
The Court began its analysis of the district court's desegregation plan
by defining the limits on a district court's remedial power to fashion a
desegregation remedy.'1 5 The Court specifically noted that the nature
and scope of a desegregation remedy must directly address the relevant
constitutional violation in a particular school district and should not con-
113. Id. at 2048. The Court said that its resistance to the State's efforts to
challenge the scope of the remedy in 1990 neither approved nor disapproved of
the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the district court's remedy was proper. Id. at
2047 (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 53 (1990) (granting certiorari to
review manner in which district court had funded desegregation remedy)). The
Court reiterated this point, noting that "' [t] he denial of a writ of certiorari imports
no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been told
many times."' Id. (quoting United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923)).
114. Id. at 2047. Thus, the Court viewed the remedy's overall scope as an issue
subsidiary to the question of whether the district court's approval of salary in-
creases was proper. Id. More specifically, the Court wrote:
Given that the District Court's basis for its salary order was grounded in
"improving the desegregative attractiveness of the KCMSD," ... we must
consider the propriety of that reliance in order to resolve properly the
State's challenge to that order. We conclude that a challenge to the
scope of the District Court's remedy is fairly included in the question
presented.
Id. (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 2048. The Court quoted Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.
for the proposition that district courts may not use desegregation remedies for
purposes beyond their scope:
"Elimination of racial discrimination in public schools is a large task and
one that should not be retarded by efforts to achieve broader purposes
lying beyond the jurisdiction of the school authorities. One vehicle can
carry only a limited amount of baggage. It would not serve the important
objective of Brown I to seek to use school desegregation cases for pur-
poses beyond their scope, although desegregation of schools ultimately
will have impact on other forms of discrimination."
Id. (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-23.
(1971)). For a further discussion of the Court's holding in Swann, see supra notes
34-40 and accompanying text.
The Jenkins Court specifically noted that three years after its holding in Swann,
in Milliken I, the Court found that a district court exceeded its remedial authority
when it fashioned an overly broad desegregation remedy: "[I] n Milliken I ... we
held that a District Court had exceeded its authority in fashioning interdistrict
relief where the surrounding school districts had not themselves been guilty of any
constitutional violation." Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048 (citing Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717,
746-47 (1974)). For a further discussion of the Court's holding in Milliken I, see
supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
The Court contended that Milliken I supported the notion that lacking an
interdistrict violation and inteydistrict effect, no basis exists for a desegregation rem-
edy calling for an interdistrict remedy. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048 (emphasis
added).
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cern surrounding districts innocent of constitutional wrongdoing.1 16 Fur-
thermore, the Court explained that its holding in Freeman v. Pitts outlined
the necessary showing for partial or complete relief from a desegregation
order.' 17 This showing depends upon a demonstration that the victims of
discriminatory conduct have achieved the position they would have occu-
pied in the absence of that conduct."1 8
In applying this analysis to the KCMSD desegregation plan, the Court
questioned whetherJudge Russell Clark adopted both an interdistrict rem-
edy where no interdistrict violation existed and set forth the desegregation
remedy's appropriate scope. 119 "[T]he proper response by the District
Court should have been to eliminate to the extent practicable the vestiges
of prior de jure segregation within the KCMSD: a system-wide reduction in
student achievement and the' existence of 25 racially identifiable schools
with a population of over 90% black students."'120 Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued, however, that the district court and court of appeals had consistently
promoted a remedy focused on "desegregative attractiveness" coupled
with "suburban comparability," rather than focusing on eliminating deseg-
regation to the "extent practicable." 12 1 The Court held that its resolution
116. Id. at 2049. The Court summarized the three-part test articulated in Mil-
liken. Id. First, the nature of a desegregation remedy must be determined by the
nature and scope of the constitutional violation. Id. Second, the desegregation
plan must be remedial in nature, designed to restore the victims of discriminatory
conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of the discrimi-
nation. Id. Third, district courts must carefully consider the interests of states and
local authorities in managing their own affairs. Id. (citing Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267,
280-81 (1977)).
117. Id. The Court cited Freeman's three-part test, which stated the relevant
factors that must inform a court's discretion when considering the partial or com-
plete withdrawal of its supervision: (1) whether there has been full and satisfactory
compliance with the desegregation plan in those parts of the system where supervi-
sion is to be withdrawn; (2) whether retention of judicial control is necessary or
practical to achieve compliance with the desegregation plan's other components
and (3) whether the school district has demonstrated, to the victims of discrimina-
tion, a good faith commitment to the court's desegregation decree. Id. (citing
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1993)). For a further discussion of the Freeman
test, see supra note 56 and accompanying text. ,
. 118. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2049. This standard also requires eventual restora-
tion of state and local control of a school system that complies with the Constitu-
tion. Id. (citing Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489).
119. Id. at 2050. The Court noted that the district court and court of appeals
found no interdistrict constitutional violation that would support an interdistrict
remedy. Id. See also Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 37 n.3 (1990) ("The District
Court also found that none of the alleged discriminatory actions had resulted in
lingering interdistrict effects and so dismissed the suburban school districts and
denied interdistrict relief.").
120. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050 (citingJenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24,
36 (W.D. Mo. 1985)). For a further discussion of the district court's original deseg-
regation goals, see supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
. 121. Id. According to justice Rehnquist, the district court had set out to cre-
ate a school district that was equal to or superior to the surrounding suburban
school districts. Id.
1995] NOTE 1431
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of the salary-order issue would be framed within the context of this
remedy. 122
After setting forth the framework for its analysis, the Court undertook
the task of applying that analysis to the KCMSD remedy. 123 The Court
began this task by stating that the purpose of "desegregative attractiveness"
in the KCMSD involved attracting non-minority students not enrolled in
the KCMSD. 124 The Court further recognized that the district court met
this goal through the creation of magnet schools, and contended more-
over, that the remedial programs essentially made the KCMSD a magnet
district.12 5 Essentially, the Court disliked the district court's intention to
attract nonminority students from outside the KCMSD schools. According
to the majority, this interdistrict goal exceeded the scope of the intradistrict
violation originally identified by the district court.1 2 6
The Court based its conclusion regarding the district court's authority
upon precepts set forth in Milliken .127 As discussed earlier, Milliken I
held that a desegregation remedy requiring mandatory interdistrict reas-
signment was improper when no interdistrict violation occurred.
128
Under this rule, even where a school district has ninety percent minority
students, an interdistrict remedy will not apply so long as the state's racial
discrimination did not extend to surrounding school districts. 129 The
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2051.
124. Id. The Court described this remedy as including "an elaborate program
of capital improvements, course enrichment, and extracurricular enhancement
not simply in the formerly identifiable black schools, but in schools throughout
the district." Id. For a further discussion of these programs, see supra note 87 and
accompanying text.
125. Id. at 2051. For a further discussion of magnet schools, see supra note 88
and accompanying text. The Court noted its previous acceptance of magnet
schools as an intradistrict remedy for encouraging voluntary movement of students
within a school district in a manner that aids desegregation on a voluntary basis,
without requiring busing or adjustment of district lines. Id. The Court further
recognized magnet schools as an attractive intradistrict remedy because they pro-
mote desegregation, while also limiting the withdrawal of non-minority students
that often accompanies mandatory student reassignment. Id.
126. Id. The Court believed that the District sought to achieve indirectly what
it admittedly lacked the remedial authority to mandate directly: the interdistrict
transfer of students. Id. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 38 (W.D. Mo.
1985) ("' [B] ecause of restrictions on this Court's remedial powers in restructuring
the operations of local and state government entities,' any mandatory plan which
would go beyond the boundary lines of the KCMSD goes far beyond the nature
and extent of the constitutional violation [that] this Court found existed.").
127. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2051. For a further discussion of Milliken I, see supra
notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
128. Id.; Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
129. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2051. The Court cited to justice Stewart's concur-
rence in Milliken to illustrate a situation where an interdistrict remedy might be
appropriate:
Were it to be shown, for example, that state officials had contributed to
the separation of the races by drawing or redrawing school district lines;
by transfer of school units between districts; or by purposeful, racially dis-
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Court concluded that the district court breached this rule when it fash-
ioned the KCMSD's desegregation plan, "creat[ing] a magnet district of
the KCMSD in order to serve the interdistrict goal of attracting nonmi-
nority students from the surrounding suburban school districts (SSDs)
and redistributing them within the KCMSD."' 30
The Court in Jenkins proceeded to redefine its holding in Milliken I
and further explain how the Court's progeny of desegregation cases since
Milliken I contradicted the district court and court of appeals' decisions in
Jenkins.'3 1 In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
"desegregative attractiveness" represents ajustifiable goal in light of "white
flight" from the KCMSD to the SSDs.13 2 The Court based this rejection
upon the fact that the district court made no delineation between the
cause and effect of white flight. 133
Moreover, the Court argued that Freeman requires that any vestiges of
segregation must have a causal link to the de jure segregation reme-
died. 134 In the Court's view, the district court's reliance on white flight as
a justification for the desegregation remedy in Jenkins, therefore, consti-
tuted an improper exercise of discretion because no causal link existed
between the state-imposed segregation and white flight.135
However, the Court's most substantial difficulty with the district
court's "desegregative attractiveness" goal involved the accompanying no-
criminatory use of state housing or zoning laws, then a decree calling for
the transfer of pupils across district lines or for restructuring of district
lines might well be appropriate.
Id. at 2051-52 (quoting Milliken , 418 U.S. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring)). Thus,
lacking an interdistrict violation, a desegregation plan that invokes an interdistrict
remedy is improper. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052.
130. Id. The Court held that this remedy was beyond the district court's
broad remedial authority. Id. (citing Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
131. Id.
132. Id. For a definition and further discussion of white flight, see supra note
81 and accompanying text.
133. Id. at 2052-53. The Court contended that the lower courts' findings as to
white flight lacked both internal consistency and consistency with the principle
that white flight may result from desegregation itself, not de jure segregation. Id.
at 2052. The Court also rejected the United States' amicus curiae brief, which
claimed that the de jure segregation in the KCMSD caused Caucasian students to
leave the KCMSD. Id. This departure coincided with the district court's conclu-
sion that the suburban districts did nothing to cause the white flight and therefore
could not be included in a mandatory interdistrict remedy. Id. (citing Amicus Cu-
riae Brief for the United States at 19 n.2., Missouri v.Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2052
(1995)).
The Court concluded, however, that the district court did not make sufficient
findings of interdistrict violations to justify a significant interdistrict remedy, and
moreover, that the district court explicitly recognized the lack of significant in-
terdistrict effects from de jure segregation. Id. at 2053 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri,
807 F.2d 657, 672 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court's finding of no interdis-
trict violation or effect)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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tion that the district court had limitless authority to engineer further rem-
edies.13 6 The Court coupled this concern with the potentially limitless
duration of the district court's involvement in the desegregation rem-
edy.13 7 This prospect especially troubled the Court due to the great im-
portance of restoring state and local control of a school system that
operates in compliance with the Constitution.13 8 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the district court's order of salary increases, grounded in rem-
edying the vestiges of segregation through improvement of the
"desegregative attractiveness" of the KCMSD, did not represent an accept-
able intradistrict desegregation remedy.13 9
The Jenkins Court next turned to the district court's order requiring
the continued funding of the KCMSD's quality education programs based
upon student achievement levels at or below national norms at many
grade levels. 140 The Court explicitly rejected this test as inappropriate for
determining whether a previously segregated school system has achieved
partial unitary status.141 The majority reasoned that the district court's
responsibility involves determining whether reduced student achievement
attributable to prior dejure segregation has been remedied, to the extent
practicable-not the achievement, through the indefinite extension of
quality education programs, of an undefined level of academic success.
142
136. Id. at 2054. Indeed, the Court noted that the pursuit of "desegregative
attractiveness" could not be reconciled with the Court's cases placing limitations
on courts' remedial authority. Id. The Court wrote:
It is certainly theoretically possible that the greater the expenditure per
pupil within the KCMSD, the more likely it is that some unknowable
number of nonminority students not presently attending schools in the
KCMSD will choose to enroll in those schools. Under this reasoning,
however, every increased expenditure, whether it be for teachers, nonin-
structional employees, books or buildings, will make the KCMSD in some
way more attractive, and thereby perhaps induce nonminority students to
enroll in its schools. But this rationale is not susceptible to any objective
limitation.
Id.
137. Id. The Court noted that
[e]ach additional program ordered by the District Court-and financed
by the State-to increase the "desegregative attractiveness" of the school
district makes the KCMSD more and more dependent on additional
funding from the State; in turn, the greater the KCMSD's dependence on
state funding, the greater its reliance on continued supervision by the
District Court.
Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. Ultimately, the Court viewed the district court's "desegregative attrac-
tiveness" goal as creating too many imponderables, thus placing the remedy be-
yond the district court's broad discretion. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2055. The Court maintained that although the district court had
determined that de jure segregation caused a system-wide reduction in student
achievement, it never identified the incremental effect that segregation had on
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In accordance with this holding, the Court directed the district court
to apply the three-part test set forth in Freeman in determining the
KCMSD's unitary status, and moreover, instructed the district court to
"sharply limit, if not dispense with, its reliance" on test scores to measure
the district's unitary status.' 43 The Court further noted that numerous
external factors independent of de jure segregation can potentially affect
both racial composition of the KCMSD schools and minority students' aca-
demic achievement. 44 Thus, the Court held, the district court's use of
academic goals unrelated to the effects of "legal segregation" improperly
postpones the operation of an independent KCMSD.1 45
2. O'Connor's Concurrence: Determining the Proper Scope of the KCMSD
Desegregation Remedy
In what appeared to be a direct response to justice Souter's dissenting
opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion examined the practical
effect of the district court's desegregation remedy.' 46 Justice O'Connor
began by reiterating Justice Rehnquist's sentiment that no unfairness ex-
isted in the Court's resolution of the "desegregative attractiveness" is-
sue. 14 7 Justice O'Connor then reasoned that the Court's opinion
coincided with both Supreme Court precedent and the district court's
originally stated desegregation goals. 148
minority student achievement, nor did it allude to the quality education programs'
precise goals. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2056. The Court asserted that these factors do not influence the
remedial analysis so long as they are not the result of dejure segregation. Id. For
a further discussion of demographics and de jure segregation, see infra note 154
and accompanying text.
145. Id. In support of this contention, the Court noted that minority students
in kindergarten through grade seven had always attended "AAA-rated" schools,
and that minority students in the KCMSD who previously attended schools rated
below AAA received remedial education programs for seven years. Id.
146. Id. at 2060 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a discussion of Justice Sou-
ter's dissenting opinion, see infra notes 181-213 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 2057 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor argued that
the State's opening brief placed the respondents on notice of its argument con-
cerning desegregative attractiveness. Id. at 2056. The respondents received fur-
ther notice through the lower courts' explicit reliance on the need for
desegregative attractiveness and suburban comparability in the KCMSD. Id. at
2057 (citingJenkins v. Missouri, 13 F.3d 1170, 1172 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The signifi-
cant finding of the court with respect to the earlier funding order was that the
salary increases were essential to comply with the court's desegregation order, and
that high quality teachers, administrators, and staff must be hired to improve the
desegregative attractiveness of [the] KCMSD.")); Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755,
767 (8th Cir. 1993) ("In addition to compensating the victims, the remedy in this
case was also designed to reverse white flight by offering superior education oppor-
tunities."). Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that the Court did not transgress
any "bounds of orderly adjudication in resolving a genuine dispute that [was]
properly presented for its decision." Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2057.
148. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2057. In particular, Justice O'Connor addressed
Justice Souter's argument that the Court's holding conflicted with the Court's
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Justice O'Connor specifically criticized the dissent's reliance on Gau-
treaux v. Hills.149 Justice O'Connor maintained that Gautreaux, which con-
cerned HUD's administrative practice in remedying discrimination in
public housing, corresponded with the Court's holding in Milliken I, be-
cause Gautreaux did not concern a case of interdistrict relief in the same
sense as Milliken I and other desegregation cases. 150 In essence, Justice
O'Connor differentiated between the two instances because the Court in
Gautreaux found that drawing a remedial line at the city limits would be
"arbitrary and mechanical," while in Jenkins the KCMSD's boundaries
served as the proper confines for the district court's remedial plan.15 1
Justice O'Connor buttressed her argument by noting the Eighth Cir-
cuit's past holding, that no significant interdistrict effects existed in the
suburban Kansas City school districts. In particular, Justice O'Connor em-
ployed this holding to profess the notion that neither the legal responsibil-
ity, nor the causal effects of the KCMSD's racial segregation, transgressed
its boundaries-and therefore, a Gautreaux-style regional plan was an inap-
propriate remedy for the KCMSD's dejure segregation.152 Finally, Justice
holding in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2057. Jus-
tice O'Connor noted that in Gautreaux, the Court held that no per se rule exists
that federal courts lack authority to order parties violating the Constitution to un-
dertake remedial efforts beyond the municipal boundaries where the violation oc-
curred. Id. (citing Gautreaux 425 U.S. at 298). Furthermore, Justice O'Connor
argued that this holding corresponded with the Court's holding in Milliken L Id.
Specifically, Justice O'Connor contended that the holding flowed from Milliken l's
rule that a court may permit an interdistrict remedy upon a showing that a consti-
tutional violation occurred within one district that has a significant segregative ef-
fect in another district. Id. Moreover, Justice O'Connor concluded that Gautreaux
did not eliminate Milliken 's requirement that such interdistrict remedies may only
occur upon a showing that intradistrict violations produced significant interdistrict
effects. Id. (emphasis added) ("[I1f anything, our opinion repeatedly affirmed
that principle.").
149. Id. at 2058. See Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 292-94 (holding interdistrict rem-
edy appropriate where intradistrict constitutional violation has significant interdis-
trict effects). For a discussion of the dissent's arguments concerning Gautreaux,
see infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
150. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2058.
151. Id. (citing Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 300). In Gautreaux, "the relevant geo-
graphic area for purposes of the respondents' housing options [was] the Chicago
housing market, not the Chicago city limits." Id. The fact that the Housing and
Urban Development's administrative practice involved treating the Chicago metro-
politan area as an undifferentiated whole buttressed this conclusion. Id.
152. Id. at 2059. Justice O'Connor expressed dissatisfaction with Justice Sou-
ter's argument that white flight to the suburban school districts could justify an
interdistrict remedy. Id. Justice O'Connor wrote that "[w]hatever effects [the]
KCMSD's constitutional violation may be ventured to have had on the surrounding
districts, those effects would justify interdistrict relief only if they were 'segregative
beyond the KCMSD"'. Id. For Justice O'Connor, white flight could not be cor-
rected through an interdistrict remedy. Rather,Justice O'Connor discussed a situ-
ation where white flight would summon the need for an interdistrict remedy:
Such segregative effect may be present where a predominately black dis-
trict accepts black children from adjacent districts .... or perhaps even
where the fact of intradistrict segregation actually causes whites to flee
1436 [Vol. 40: p. 1395
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O'Connor expressed displeasure with the district court's "underlying goal"
of desegregative attractiveness, arguing that the district court may only at-
tempt to reverse white flight if it results from the constitutional viola-
tion.1 53 Relying on previous findings that neither interdistrict violations
nor significant interdistrict effects existed outside the KCMSD, Justice
O'Connor held that the district court could not order remedies that cure
regional demographic trends going beyond the nature and scope of the
constitutional violation.1 54 In essence, Justice O'Connor viewed such at-
tempted remedies as beyond the nature and scope of the constitutional
violation, and thus, an abuse of the district court's discretion.
1 55
3. Thomas' Concurrence: Quality Education or the Attainment of
Unspecified Goals?
Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in Jenkins illustrated his disdain
for the notion that a predominately African-American school district must
be inferior. 156 In fact, Justice Thomas' opinion did not offer an alterna-
tive substantive ground for the Court's opinion, but rather provided Jus-
the district, . . . for example, to avoid discriminatorily underfunded
schools-and such actions produce regional segregation along district
lines. In those cases, where a purely intradistrict violation has caused a
significant interdistrict segregative effect, certain interdistrict remedies
may be appropriate. Where, however, the segregative effects of a dis-
trict's constitutional violation are contained within that district's bounda-
ries, there is no justification for a remedy that is interdistrict in nature
and scope.
Id. at 2059-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 2060 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In contrast, if restoring the
KCMSD to unitary status indirectly reversed the departure of nonminority students
from the KCMSD, then the reversal would not influence the legal inquiry into the
district court's desegregation plan. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor specifically stated:
This case, like other school desegregation litigation, is concerned with
'the elimination of the discrimination inherent in the dual school sys-
tems, not with myriad factors of human existence which can cause dis-
crimination in a multitude of ways on racial, religious, or ethnic
grounds." Those myriad factors are not readily correctable by judicial
intervention, but are best addressed by the representative branches; time
and again, we have recognized the ample authority legislatures possess to
combat racial injustice.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor concluded
that courts, unlike legislatures, do not have discretion to determine what legisla-
tion is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment-especially
in areas such as education, "'where States historically have been sovereign."' Id. at
2061 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624,
1632-33 (1995)).
155. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Indeed, in the local school desegrega-
tion context, federal courts are specifically admonished 'to take into account the
interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs.' (quoting
Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977)).
156. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) ("It never ceases to amaze me that the
courts are so willing to assume that anything that is predominately black must be
inferior.").
NOTE 14371995]
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tice Thomas with the opportunity to embark on a lengthy discourse about
African-American inferiority, federalism and equitable desegregation
remedies.1 57
Justice Thomas laid the groundwork for this argument by restating
the general principle that racial imbalance does not necessarily indicate a
constitutional violation: "[i] t should by now be clear that the existence of
one-race schools is not by itself an indication that the State is practicing
segregation."1 58 AsJustices Rehnquistand O'Connor noted in their opin-
ions, Justice Thomas attributed continuing racial isolation in the KCMSD
to demographic factors such as voluntary housing choices and other pri-
vate decisions, not to vestiges of unconstitutional state imposed segrega-
tion.159 Justice Thomas argued that such vestiges of segregation must be
"clearly traceable" and have a "causal link" to the de jure constitutional
violation.1 60 Justice Thomas observed that as state-imposed segregation
recedes farther into the past, racial imbalances result from demographic
shifts, which exceed the federal courts' control.16 ' Thus, when a district
court holds a state liable for state-imposed discrimination, it must demon-
strate a real connection between high minority student enrollments and
unconstitutional state action.1 62 Moreover, Justice Thomas suggested
placing a new burden on federal courts addressing school desegregation
157. Id. (ThomasJ, concurring). Justice Thomas argued that two principles
in the Court's desegregation jurisprudence contributed to the "unfortunate situa-
tion, in which a District Court has taken it upon itself to experiment with the
education of the KCMSD's black youth." Id. at 2062. (Thomas, J., concurring).
First, Justice Thomas maintained that the Court's desegregation cases do not sup-
port the theory that African-American students suffer an unspecified psychological
harm from segregation. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas criticized
this theory because it rests upon "questionable social science research rather than
constitutional principle." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Second, Justice Thomas
admonished the federal courts' exercise of virtually unlimited equitable powers to
remedy these alleged constitutional violations. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Ac-
cording to Justice Thomas, this unlimited discretion abused federalism and the
separation of powers. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
158. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). justice Thomas noted that before finding
unconstitutional segregation, plaintiffs must prove a current condition of segrega-
tion resulting from intentional state action. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205-06 (1973)). Without this purposeful
state action, the segregation is only de facto, and cannot justify a finding of uncon-
stitutional segregation. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 2062-63 (Thomas, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 2063 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas recognized that
these links may be "subtle and intangible," and also recognized that district courts
should not confuse the consequences of de jure segregation with results of social
forces or private decisions. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
161. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that "[i]t is beyond the authority
and beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to try to counteract" these
social changes).
162. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) ("When a district court holds the State lia-
ble for discrimination almost 30 years after the last official state action, it must do
more than show that there are schools with high populations or low test scores.").
1438 [Vol. 40: p. 1395
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cases, proposing that courts should explain how social or demographic
factors did not cause racial isolation in a particular district.1 63
After establishing this basic framework, Justice Thomas began his at-
tack on the inherent inferiority of predominately African-American
schools.1 64 Justice Thomas argued that this concept stemmed from a mis-
reading of the Court's decision in Brown I, where the Court held that seg-
regation stigmatized African-American students by creating a feeling of
inferiority in them.1 6 5 According to Justice Thomas, Brown I did not say
that racially isolated schools, a product of de facto separation, are inher-
ently inferior; rather, the Brown Court identified dejure segregation as the
constitutional violation.' 66 Justice Thomas rejected the district court's
seeming reliance on these psychological factors because it did not relate to
whether government action caused racial discrimination: "[t]he judiciary
is fully competent to make independent determinations concerning the
existence of state action without the unnecessary and misleading assist-
ance of the social sciences."1 67 Most importantly for Justice Thomas, the
theory that segregation injures African-Americans because they cannot
achieve on their own, invokes ajurisprudence based upon a theory of Afri-
can-American inferiority. 168
163. Id. at 2063-64 (Thomas, J., concurring). ("In fact, where, as here....
liability comes so late in the day, I would think it incumbent upon the District
Court to explain how more recent social or demographic phenomena did not
cause the 'vestiges' [of discrimination].").
164. Id. at 2064 (Thomas, J., concurring).
165. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted that the district
court relied on these psychologic factors when fashioning the original desegrega-
tion remedy. Id. (Thomas,J., concurring). In particular, Justice Thomas cited the
district court's contention that African-American students in the KCMSD would
continue to receive an inferior education even after the end of de jure segrega-
tion, as long as de facto segregation remained. Id. (Thomas,J., concurring). Jus-
tice Thomas rejected this rationale: "[s]uch assumptions and any social science
research upon which they rely certainly cannot form the basis upon which we de-
cide matters of constitutional principle." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 2065 (Thomas,J., concurring). Justice Thomas specified Brown I's
most basic holding that the government cannot discriminate on the basis of race
and that the government must treat citizens as individuals, not as members of ra-
cial, ethnic or religious groups. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Apart from any
sociological effects, Justice Thomas noted that public school systems that separate
any class of students and provide those students with superior resources would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether or not those particular students were
stigmatized. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
167. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Thomas suggested that:
there is no reason to think that black students cannot learn as well when
surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in an inte-
grated environment .... Because of their "distinctive histories and tradi-
tions," black schools can function as the center and symbol of black
communities, and provide examples of independent black leadership,
success, and achievement.
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
168. Id. at 2065-66 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas held that the
point of the Fourteenth Amendment is not to enforce racial integration, but to
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Justice Thomas next embarked on a protracted criticism of the dis-
trict court's overly broad exercise of "equitable discretion." 169 Justice
Thomas recognized that federal courts possessed wide-ranging powers to
reverse problems such as racial isolation, and that the Supreme Court had
allowed these powers to overcome constitutional limits such as federalism
and the separation of powers.' 70 In Jenkins, however, Justice Thomas
wrote that "It]he time has come for us to put the genie back in the bot-
tle."1 71 In support of this aspiration, Justice Thomas entered upon a
lengthy historical discussion ofjudicial power and original intent, conclud-
ing that the district court's desegregation remedy in the KCMSD repre-
sented a flagrant exercise of powers properly allotted the executive and
legislative branches.' 7 2
Moreover, Justice Thomas perceived the KCMSD desegregation plan
as an infringement of state and local control of schools-an infringement
that effectively deprives state and local governments of their ability to man-
age one of their most important governmental responsibilities.173 Fur-
ensure that differing races are treated equally without regard to their skin color.
Id. at 2066.
169. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
170. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas viewed this overly broad
grant of discretion as a primary cause of the district court's approval of massive
expenditures in the KCMSD by state and local authorities, without congressional
or executive approval. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
171. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas argued that the Court's
worthy desire to end state-imposed segregation directly caused the belief that fed-
eral trial judges have unlimited discretion to develop desegregation remedies once
they identify a constitutional violation. Id. at 2066-67 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)). For a further discussion of the Court's holding in Milli-
ken I, see supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the
Court's holding in Swann, see supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
Further, Justice Thomas noted that this overly broad grant of equitable power
resulted from the Court's effort to overcome widespread resistance to the Brown
holdings in the 1960s. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Consequently, Justice
Thomas added, the judicial overreaching typified in the KCMSD could be attrib-
uted to the Court's prior approval of such extraordinary remedies in the past. Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 2067-71 (Thomas, J. concurring). Justice Thomas used this histori-
cal discussion to fortify the notion that the district court's continued control over
the KCMSD desegregation plan was unfounded in traditional American jurispru-
dence. Id. at 2069 (Thomas, J., concurring). Among others, Justice Thomas in-
voked the writings of both ThomasJefferson and Alexander Hamilton to fortify his
argument. Id. at 2068-69 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas pointed to
these founding fathers' arguments that judges should not have arbitrary power,
and further, that precedent and established practices should dictate judge's deci-
sions. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 9 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (J.
Boyd. ed., 1954); THE FEDERALIsT No. 78 528 (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
173. Id. at 2070 (Thomas, J., concurring). According to Justice Thomas, the
"'local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition."' Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Dayton , 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977)). In addition, Justice
Thomas cited the Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624(1995), where a narrow majority of the Court held that Congress exceeded its
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ther, Justice Thomas argued that federal courts do not possess the
capability to address everyday educational problems in the same manner
as local officials, a shortcoming amplified by courts' limited access to infor-
mation and resources, and courts' inherent inability to achieve political
and public support for their decrees. 174 In applying this analysis to the
district court's actions in the KCMSD, Justice Thomas concluded that the
district court transcended its judicial boundaries and effectively usurped
responsibilities properly exercised in the legislature. 175
Finally, Justice Thomas criticized the district court for failing to nar-
rowly target its equitable remedies on the specific harm suffered by victims
of desegregation in the KCMSD. 176 Specifically, Justice Thomas asserted
that raising the test scores of the entire district reflects a goal not suffi-
ciently tailored to restoring the victims of desegregation to the position
they would have occupied without desegregation. 177 While the district
court may order remedies that indirectly benefit nonvictims of segrega-
tion, Justice Thomas held that court could not order remedies that indis-
criminately benefit the whole school district. 178 Rather, Justice Thomas
suggested that district courts should design desegregation orders to specif-
ically benefit victims of segregation. 179 In sum, Justice Thomas concluded
power under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
Id. (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31). The Gun-Free School Zones Act made it a
federal offense to possess a gun in a school zone. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
Justice Kennedy noted in his dissent that "it is well established that education is a
traditional concern of the states." Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
174. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2070 (ThomasJ., concurring).
175. Id. at 2071 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted:
I believe that we must impose more precise standards and guidelines on
the federal equitable power, not only to restore predictability to the law
and reduce judicial discretion, but also to ensure that constitutional rem-
edies are actually targeted toward those who have been injured.
Id.
176. Id. at 2072 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas viewed efforts to
eliminate "invidious racial distinctions" in areas such as student assignments, trans-
portation, staff resource allocation and activities as the most important aspects of a
desegregation plan. Id. While these elements of desegregation plans are fairly
straightforward, it is often the "compensatory" ingredients that produce abuse of
the judiciary's equitable powers. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 2072-73 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted: "A
school district cannot be discriminated against on the basis of race, because a
school district has no race. It goes without saying that only individuals can suffer
from discrimination, and only individuals can receive the remedy." Id. (Thomas,
J., concurring).
178. Id. at 2073 (Thomas, J. concurring). Justice Thomas noted: "Not only
do such remedies tend to indicate 'efforts to achieve broader purposes lying be-
yond' the scope of the violation ... but they also force state and local governments
to work toward the benefit of those who have suffered no harm from their ac-
tions." Id. at 2073 (Thomas, J., concurring).
179. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas contended that remedies
addressing racial discrimination must serve a compelling governmental interest,
but must also be narrowly tailored to achieve the sought-after interest. Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-
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that "[e]ven if segregation were present, we must remember that a deserv-
ing end does not justify all possible means .... At some point, we must
recognize that the judiciary is not omniscient, and that all problems do
not require a remedy of constitutional proportions."1 8 0
4. Souter's Dissent: Debating the Effects of Dejure Segregation
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion faulted the majority's holding on
several grounds.' 8 1 First, Justice Souter argued that the Court's orderly
process of adjudication failed, based upon the Court's improper treatment
of the issues for review in Jenkins.18 2 Second, the dissent argued that the
majority handled the test score and salary order issues inappropriately be-
cause the majority failed to accurately interpret the district court's original
desegregation order.1 83 Finally, the dissent faulted the majority's treat-
ment of the "interdistrict-intradistrict" debate in relation to the
KCMSD. 184
Justice Souter's first disagreement with the majority concerned the
"questions presented" thatJustice Rehnquist addressed in his opinion. 185
In essence, Justice Souter believed that the majority opinion improperly
10 (1989)). Accordingly, absent special circumstances, a remedy for dejure segre-
gation should not include educational programs for students not directly affected
by the former segregation. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
Moreover, Justice Thomas urged that courts should not use racial equality as a
pretext for attempting to remedy complex social problems, which do not involve
the Constitution. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). More specifically, "[f]ederal
courts should not lightly assume that States have caused 'racial isolation' in 1984
by maintaining a segregated school system in 1954." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
180. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 2073 (Souter,J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyerjoined Justice Souter's dissenting opinion. Id. For a further discussion of the
majority opinion, see supra notes 112-45 and accompanying text.
182. Id. at 2073-74 (Souter, J. dissenting). Justice Souter recognized that
[s]ince ... the respondent school district and pupils naturally came to
this Court without expecting that a fundamental premise of a portion of
the District Court's remedial order would become the focus of this case,
the essence of the Court's misjudgment in reviewing and repudiating that
central premise lies in its failure to have warned the respondents of what
was really at stake.
Id. Justice Souter commented that the State's failure to address the precise hold-
ing of the majority "infected the Court's decision." Id. at 2074 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
183. Id. at 2078-79, 2081-82 (SouterJ., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2083 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter commented, "the
Court's decision that the rule against interdistrict remedies for intradistrict viola-
tions applies to this case, solely because the remedy here is meant to produce ef-
fects outside the district in which the violation occurred, is flatly contrary to
established precedent." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 2076 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter cited the States "ques-
tions for review" to buttress his observation. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter characterized both questions presented as focusing on "two discrete issues,
... fram[ing] no broader, foundational question about the validity of the District
Court's magnet concept." Id. (Souter, J. dissenting).
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focused on the Milliken "interdistrict" issue in its opinion because the par-
ties in Jenkins did not brief or argue the issue.18 6 Rather, Justice Souter
argued, the only questions for review included: (1) the extent to which a
district court may look at student test scores in determining whether a
school district has attained partial unitary status, and (2) whether salary
increases reflect a permissible remedy for desegregation. 187 Because the
State did not go beyond these issues in its petition for certiorari, Justice
Souter argued that the Court should not reach such questions on its own
initiative.188
After concluding his discussion of the majority's procedural failings,
Justice Souter turned to the majority's treatment of the test score issue. 189
Justice Souter noted that this question represents "one of word play, not
substance" and that "none of the District Court's or Court of Appeals's
opinions or orders require[d] a certain level of test scores before unitary
status can be found, or indicates that test scores are the only thing stand-
ing between the State and a finding of unitary status as to the KCMSD's
Milliken II programs."' 90
Indeed, Justice Souter argued, the Eighth Circuit did not treat tests
scores as a dispositive issue in its adjudication of the KCMSD's achieve-
ment of unitary status."9 ' Justice Souter professed that the district court
186. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter cited Supreme Court Rule
14.1 in support of his position that the Court improperly decided the broader issue
of the propriety of the State's remedial scheme. Id. at 2076-77 (Souter,J., dissent-
ing). Rule 14.1 states that "[o]nly questions set forth in the petition, or fairly in-
cluded therein, will be considered." Id. at 2076 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter rejected the majority's position that the broader issue is "fairly included in
the State's salary question." Id. at 2077 (Souter, J., dissenting). Relying upon an
earlier definition of "fairly included," Justice Souter stated that the broader issue
is not fairly included in the questions presented because it is not central to the
Court's resolution of the narrow questions presented for review. Id. (Sourer, J.,
dissenting).
187. Id. at 2076 (Souter, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 2077 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Court's failure to give notice to
the parties of its intention to reach the broader interdistrict issue troubled Justice
Souter the most. Id. at 2077-78 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted:
If there is any doubt about the lack of fairness and prejudice displayed by
the Court, it should disappear upon seeing... how the Court's decision
to go beyond [the questions presented] to address an issue not ade-
quately briefed or argued by one set of parties leads it to render an opin-
ion anchored in neither the findings and evidence contained in the
record, nor in controlling precedent, which is squarely at odds with the
Court's holding today.
Id. at 2078 (Souter, J.; dissenting).
189. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
191. Id. (SouterJ., dissenting). Justice Souter relied on the Eighth Circuit's
denial of an en banc rehearing as evidence of the Eighth Circuit's position regard-
ing the role of test scores. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter quoted a
passage from the opinion that squarely addressed the issue: "[t] est scores. ... must
be only one factor in the equation [in determining whether past discrimination
was remedied]. Nothing in this court's opinion, [or] the district court's opinion
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did not enter a finding of partial unitary status simply because the State
did not attempt to make the required showing for unitary status set forth
in Freeman.'9 2 Thus, the State's failure to meet its burden under Freeman
led the Eighth Circuit to reject a finding of partial unitary status. 1 9 3 More-
over, Justice Souter concluded that while test scores will undoubtedly play
a role in the attainment of unitary status, it would be improper to require
achievement of a pre-established national average. 19 4 Thus, the Court
should view the test scores in relation to the other facts developed in the
unitary status proceedings.' 95
Following his discussion of test scores, Justice Souter turned to the
majority's handling of the district court's salary orders.196 Justice Souter
first noted that "the District Court ha[d] consistently treated salary in-
creases as an important element in remedying the system-wide reduction
in student achievement resulting from segregation in the KCMSD."' 97
. . . indicates that test results were the only criteria used." Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
192. Id. at 2079 (Souter, J., dissenting). In Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467
(1992), the Court set forth a clear set of procedures for governmental entities to
follow when seeking partial termination of a desegregation decree. Jenkins, 115 S.
Ct. at 2079 (Souter, J., dissenting). First, the government entity must "consider
'whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree in those
aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn."' Id. (Souter,J, dissent-
ing) (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491). Furthermore, Justice Souter noted that
full and satisfactory compliance is measured by "'whether the vestiges of past dis-
crimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable."' Id. (Souter,J., dis-
seting) (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492). At that juncture, the district court must
assess whether "the 'retention ofjudicial control is necessary... to achieve compli-
ance with the decree ... and whether the school district has demonstrated... its good-
faith commitment to ... the court's decree and to those provisions of the law and
the Constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first in-
stance." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492) (emphasis
added).
193. Id. at 2080 (Souter, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter commented that all parties to
the case agreed that it would be error to use the attainment of an average test
score equal to, or better than, the national average as the benchmark for achieving
partial unitary status. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). The parties realized that other
obstacles apart from prior de jure discrimination could factor into a test score
average that is below the national average. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). As Justice
Souter pointed out, however, student test scores have some relevance in determin-
ing whether the school district has been effective in its efforts to cure the defects
prior to its judicial intervention. Id. at 2080-81 (Souter, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 2081 (Souter, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Souter,J., dissenting). The majority did not question the apparent
goal, which involved ending the reduction in student achievement. Id. (Souter,J.,
dissenting). In recognizing the propriety of that goal, Justice Souter characterized
the remaining inquiry as whether the salary increases had a reasonable relation to
achieving the desired favorable result. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In forming a
resolution to that issue, Justice Souter suggested that it would be appropriate to
keep in mind the broad discretion of the district court in exercising its equitable
discretion. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Building upon this notion, Justice Souter recognized that the district
court's adoption of limited salary increases stemmed from evidence indi-
cating that discontinuation of desegregation funding for salary levels
would result in excessive employee turnover and a potential inability of
the KCMSD to meet its desegregative objectives.1 98 Finally, Justice Souter
criticized the majority for examining the salary orders solely in the context
of drawing students into the district's schools, when both the district court
and Eighth Circuit viewed the salary orders as serving two complementary
but distinct purposes. 199
In conclusion, Justice Souter addressed the core of the majority's
opinion-its contention that the KCMSD desegregation remedy repre-
sented an unconstitutional interdistrict remedy.20 0 Justice Souter dis-
agreed with the majority's holding on two grounds. 20 1 First,Justice Souter
argued that the district court's original interpretation of the term "in-
tradistrict" differed from the majority's interpretation. 20 2 While the dis-
trict court held that de jure segregation did not lead to segregation
outside the KCMSD, the district court did recognize that the violation had
significant effects that spanned district borders.20 3 Second, Justice Souter
198. Id.'at 2081-82 (Souter, J., dissenting). The district court faced evidence
that indicated that discontinuing desegregation funding for salary levels resulted
in their abrupt drop to 1986-87 levels. Id. (Souter,J., dissenting). As a result, the
disparity between teacher pay in the KCMSD and the nationwide level would have
increased as much as 40-45 percent. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Because such a
drastic salary reduction would inevitably lead to the loss of well-educated and com-
petent teachers, the district court found that the discontinuance of funding for
teachers' salaries would impede the accomplishment of the KCMSD's remedial
scheme. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 2083 (Souter, J., dissenting). The two complementary but distinct
purposes mentioned by Justice Souter include: (1) raising the level of student
achievement and (2) drawing students to the KCMSD schools. Id. (Souter,J., dis-
senting). Justice Souter commented that despite the dual purposes of salary in-
creases the Court overlooked the permissible former basis and rested its rejection
of the increases on the latter basis. Id. at 2082-83 (Souter, J., dissenting). Further-
more, Justice Souter recognized that to the extent that increases are justified on
remand, nothing in the Court's opinion would preclude the salary orders from
remaining in effect. Id. at 2083 (Souter, J., disseting).
200. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (SouterJ., dissenting). Justice Souter asserted that the district court
described the KCMSD intradistrict violation to mean that the violation within the
KCMSD had not led to segregation outside the KCMSD, and furthermore, that no
other school districts played a part in the constitutional violation. Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter pointed out that the district court's use of term "in-
tradistrict remedy" did not suggest that the violation had not produced effects of
any sort beyond the district. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter asserted
that the record indicated that the district court understood the interdistrict effect
of the violation. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Souter, J. dissenting). The district court and Eight Circuit based
their conclusion regarding the segregative effect on the recognition that "prepon-
derance of black students in the [KCMSD] was due to the State and [the]
KCMSD's constitutional violations, which caused white flight." Id. at 2084 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1302 (8th Cir. 1988)).
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asserted that even if one viewed the KCMSD's situation apart from this
first point, the majority's application of the rule against interdistrict reme-
dies for intradistrict violations contradicted established precedent.20 4
In supporting his first argument, Justice Souter contended that while
the majority correctly interpreted the record to indicate that the suburban
Kansas City school districts did not contribute to desegregation in the
KCMSD, this finding coincided with a finding that white flight to the sub-
urban school districts resulted from both the segregative and desegrega-
tive efforts of the KCMSD. 20 5 More directly, Justice Souter argued that the
Court is on shaky grounds when it assumes that prior segregation and later
desegregation are separable in fact as causes of "white flight," that the
flight can plausibly be said to result from desegregation alone, and that
therefore, as a matter of fact, the 'intradistrict' segregation violation
lacked the relevant consequences outside the district required to justify
the District Court's magnet concept. 20 6
Justice Souter next turned to the majority's allegedly faulty applica-
tion of Supreme Court precedent concerning the obligation to remedy
the effects of prior de jure segregation. 20 7 Justice Souter re-stated the
Court's most recent pronouncement of this obligation, set forth in Free-
man: "the duty of a former dejure district is to take 'whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch.' 20 8 Justice Souter applied this ob-
ligation to Jenkins in maintaining that although Milliken I limited a district
court's ability to craft an interdistrict remedy in the absence of an interdis-
trict violation, Milliken I did not hold that "any remedy that takes into ac-
count conditions outside of the district in which the constitutional
violation has been committed is an 'interdistrict remedy,' and as such im-
proper in the absence of an 'interdistrict violation.' 20 9
To further bolster his argument, Justice Souter relied on the Supreme
Court's holding in Hills v. Gautreaux. In Gautreaux, the Court interpreted
Milliken I to allow a district court to subject a governmental perpetrator of
segregative practices to an order for relief with consequences extending
beyond the perpetrator's own subdivision. 2 10 Justice Souter defended the
propriety of this result as long as the decree does not bind the authorities
of other governmental units that remain free from violations and segrega-
Thus, "[t]he existence of segregated schools led to white flight from the KCMSD
to suburban districts and to private schools." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 2085 (Souter, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 2084-86 (Souter, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2086 (Souter, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 2087 (Souter, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 486
(1992)).
209. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 2088 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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tive effects. 2 11 Applying this standard to the situation in Jenkins, Justice
Souter noted that the district court's remedial measures focused only
upon the operation and quality of school within the KCMSD, and that the
burden properly fell on the proven constitutional violators-the KCMSD
and the State. 212 Increasing the KCMSD's attractiveness to students from
other districts, and thereby reversing white flight, did not represent an
abuse of discretion and coincided with the nature and extent of the consti-
tutional violation.2 13
5. Ginsburg's Dissent: Remaining True to Brown 's Stated Goals
In addition to joining Justice Souter's dissent, Justice Ginsburg wrote
a short dissent to express her views on the KCMSD's remedial desegrega-
tion program. 214 Justice Ginsburg essentially faulted the majority opinion
for dismissing the effects of dejure segregation in the KCMSD.21 5 Justice
Ginsburg noted that while remedial programs in the KCMSD existed for
seven years, this duration paled in comparison to the 200 year existence of
entrenched official discrimination experienced by Missouri's minority resi-
dents, prior to 1985.216 Justice Ginsburg concluded:
Today, the Court declares illegitimate the goal of attracting
nonminority students to the Kansas City, Missouri, School Dis-
trict, and thus stops the District Court's efforts to integrate a
school district that was, in the 1984/1985 school year, sorely in
need and 68.3% black. Given the deep, inglorious history of seg-
regation in Missouri, to curtail desegregation at this time and in
this manner is an action at once too swift and too soon. 2 17
B. Critical Analysis: Remaining True to the Stated Objectives of a
Desegregation Plan
The Supreme Court's holding in Jenkins declared that the district
court's desegregation remedy in the KCMSD extended beyond constitu-
tional limitations.2 18 This holding, however, contradicts the Court's prog-
eny of desegregation cases and represents a profound step backward in
the effort to desegregate the nation's schools. First, the Supreme Court's
original holding in Brown land its progeny of desegregation cases decided
in the federal courts renounces the Court's holding in Jenkins.2 19 Second,
211. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 2089 (Souter, J., dissenting).
213. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 2091 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
216. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
217. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
218. Id. at 2038-56.
219. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational
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the majority's argument lacks soundness because it ignores the stated
objectives of the district court's original desegregation plan.2 20 Third, the
majority's decision in Jenkins opposes the Supreme Court's decisions in
Milliken Iand Milliken 11.221 Fourth, the majority's opinion does not accu-
rately draw on the principles set forth in Freeman v. Pitts, the Court's last
school segregation case.22 2 Finally, the majority erred in rejecting the dis-
trict court's use of test scores to measure the success of the desegregation
plan, and that the district court's salary increase order should not
apply.2 23
The principles set forth in the Brown cases conflict with the Jenkins
holding.22 4 In Brown I, the Supreme Court stated that "separate is inher-
enly unequal' when considering a child's education.225 Thus, the Court
properly held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
facilities are inherently unequal"). As one commentator noted, this notion that
separate being unequal invokes the great promise of Brown I:
Through the regular interaction of black and white children, the cultural
aspects of hegemony would eventually be overcome. The "stigma" of
black inferiority-and of white superiority-would dissipate in part be-
cause African-American children would obtain greater facility with the
dominant Euro-American criteria of achievement and in part because the
dominant criteria of achievement would, over time, become less distinctly
Euro-American and more fairly representative of all American cultures.
Hayman & Levit, supra note 18, at 705. For a further discussion of the Brown
decisions and their influences on Jenkins, see infra notes 224-232 and accompany-
ing text.
220. For a discussion of the argument that the majority's opinion lacks sound-
ness because it ignores the stated objectives of the district court's original desegre-
gation plan, see infra notes 233-48 and accompanying text.
221. For a discussion of the argument that the majority's decision in Jenkins
opposes the Supreme Court's, decisions in Milliken land Milliken II, see infra notes
250-54 and accompanying text.
222. For a discussion of the argument that the majority's opinion does not
accurately draw on the principles set forth in Freeman v. Pitts, see infra notes 255-62
and accompanying text.
223. For a discussion of the argument that the majority erred in rejecting the
district court's use of test scores as a measuring tool and that the district court's
salary increase order should not apply, see infra notes 263-65 and accompanying
text.
224. Brown I and Brown II served as broad pronouncements on the adverse
effect of racial separation on African-American children and what school districts
should do to remedy this effect. Devins, supra note 20, at 14. See Brown I, 349 U.S.
294, 299 (1955) (stating that school authorities have primary responsibility of solv-
ing school desegregation problems); Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 (stating that state-
imposed segregation has adverse effect on African-American's inherent ability to
learn).
The Brown Courts' clearest conflict with Jenkins, however, is illustrated in
Brown I's holding that district courts constitute the most proper forum to deal
with school desegregation because of their proximity to local conditions. Brown II,
349 U.S. at 299. The Court further held that lower courts should have flexibility in
creating remedies and that the courts would be guided by equitable principles. Id.
at 300.
225. Brown , 347 U.S. at 495.
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ment guarantees equal educational opportunity.22 6 Subsequently, the
Court, in Brown II, compelled school boards to eliminate state-imposed
dual school systems.22 7 The Court recognized that federal district courts
constituted the most appropriate forum to administer this process. 22 8
Judge Clark echoed Brown f's bold directives when he stated his origi-
nal goals for the KCMSD's desegregation plan.229 In addressing the wide-
spread reduction in academic achievement in the KCMSD as attributable
226. Id. In Brown , the Supreme Court re-examined the "separate but equal"
doctrine, established in Plessy v. Ferguson. Id. at 488. See supra notes 2, 16-20 and
accompanying text. The Supreme Court rejected the application of this doctrine
in public schools, and declared that segregation of children in public schools
solely on the basis of race denies African-Americans equal protection of the laws
under the Constitution. Id. at 495. See supra notes 2, 16-20 and accompanying
text. The Supreme Court thus declared that the existence of dual school systems
violated the Constitution and later held that school districts had the duty to deseg-
regate their schools. See Brown 1, 349 U.S. at 301 (holding that school systems
must desegregate with "all deliberate speed"). Presently, as race relations are im-
proving throughout the nation, African-Americans still face the problem originally
addressed in Brown lover forty years ago. SeeJackson, supra note 1, at 416 (arguing
for interdistrict remedies to eliminate vestiges of racial segregation); see also Alison
Morantz, Money, Choice and Equity: Major Investments With Modest Returns 1 (Harvard
Graduate School of Education 1994) (finding Kansas City, Missouri's attempt at
desegregation has produced only modest gains in racial balance and test scores);
Gary Orfield, Still Separate, Still Unequal (Harvard Project on School Desegregation
1994) (raising questions about racial integration and finding that large ethnic and
racial disparities still exist in academic achievement); Gerald D. Suttles, School De-
segregation and the "National Community," in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION RESEARCH 58
(J. Prager et al. eds., 1986) (noting that various school districts in south are
resegregating).
Moreover, the Supreme Court, in Brown I, recognized the importance of an
integrated education to African-American children's overall development and po-
tential success in society. Brown , 347 U.S. at 493. Specifically, the Court noted:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the impor-
tance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in prepar-
ing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust nor-
mally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id.
227. Brown 1, 349 U.S. at 301. For a further discussion of the holding in
Brown I, see supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
228. Id. at 300-01. For a further discussion of the Brown II Court's holding
that federal district courts remained the most appropriate forum to oversee deseg-
regation orders, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
229. See generallyJenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (design-
ing wide-ranging desegregation plan for KCMSD). For a further discussion of the
original desegregation order in Jenkins, see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying
text.
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to de jure racial segregation, Judge Clark fashioned a desegregation plan
designed to integrate the KCMSD's schools and to improve the quality of
education for students in the KCMSD.23 0 These goals remain unfulfilled
and thus, the district court's remedial supervision of the KCMSD remains
unfinished. 23 1 The majority's opinion in Jenkins, therefore, contradicts
the original mandate of the Brown cases.232
230. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 22-56. For an in depth discussion and description
of the district court's original desegregation remedy, see supra notes 83-89 and
accompanying text. Judge Clark explicitly relied on Brown II when he explained
the source of the court's power to fashion such a remedy. Id. at 23. Judge Clark
held that:
The principles that have guided this Court in implementing a desegrega-
tion plan for the KCMSD are clear. "In fashioning, and effectuating (de-
segregation) . . . decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable
principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and recon-
ciling public and private needs."
Id. (quoting Brown AI, 349 U.S. at 300 (alteration in original)). Judge Clark contin-
ued that the goal of the desegregation decree was clear: "The goal is the elimina-
tion of all vestiges of state imposed segregation." Id.
Finally, the Brown decisions support the continuation of these programs be-
cause the district court has repeatedly found in subsequent orders that the effects
of state-imposed segregation remain in the KCMSD. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, No.
77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. filed July 30, 1993) (finding that components of deseg-
regation plan were unfulfilled);Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo.
filedJune 30, 1993) (approving salary increases for teachers in KCMSD);Jenkins v.
Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. filed June 17, 1993) (extending desegre-
gatioi plan and approving new long range magnet program);Jenkins v. Missouri,
No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. filed Apr. 16,1993) (finding that goals of desegre-
gation plan were not satisfied and ordering extension of desegregation plan); Jen-
kins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. filed Apr. 23, 1990) (approving
several adjustments to desegregation plan, but recognizing continued effects of
state-imposed discrimination); Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo.
filed July 25, 1988) (approving request of KCMSD for additional magnet program
support).
231. See Dennis Kelly, Money Fails to Desegregate K.C., USA TODAY, Apr. 25,
1994, at OD (discussing that percent of minority students in KCMSD climbed
from 73.5 percent to 74.8 percent between 1986 and 1993, and elementary school
made modest, though statistically significant gains in academic achievement); Jen-
kins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. filed Apr. 16, 1993) (finding that
evidence supports finding of increased racial isolation in elementary schools and
that there has been trend of improvement in academic achievement, but has not
reached anywhere close to its maximum potential because KCMSD is still at or
below national norms at many grade levels).
232. See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (granting district courts practical
flexibility to shape remedies); Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (recognizing in-
tentional segregative acts as unconstitutional under Fourteenth Amendment).
Taken together, the Brown cases established that racial discrimination in public
schools represented an evil that required swift disestablishment. See Devins, supra
note 20, at 14 (arguing that Brown cases both struck down state-imposed segrega-
tion and established remedial structure to eliminate "varied local school
problems.").
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Second, the majority's reasoning in Jenkins was unsound because it
ignored the district court's original objectives. 233 The majority in Jenkins
argued that Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education and Milliken I
disclaimed the right to "any particular degree of racial balancing or mix-
ing" in schools and further limited a district court's ability to fashion de-
segregation remedies. 234 Nevertheless, the majority failed to recognize
Swann's holding that effectiveness in eliminating vestiges of discrimination
constitutes the standard when assessing whether a school district, or as-
pects of its operations, should be declared unitary. 235 The majority ig-
nored this standard and did not even allege that the desegregation plan
had remedied the system-wide reduction in student achievement, to the ex-
tent practicable.2 3 6
233. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 400 (8th Cir. 1994) (Beam, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that district court imbedded student achievement goal to test
whether KCMSD has built high-quality education system). The district court, in
1985, found that segregation had caused an actual reduction in student achieve-
ment and had caused a disproportionate number of African-American students to
achieve in the lower ranks. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 24-25. Thus, for the state to
receive a declaration of unitary status relating to the educational components of
the desegregation remedy, it must show that achievement has increased to the
level it would have been without the legacy of segregation, and that African-Ameri-
can student achievement has been specifically cured of the harm it suffered due to
the State's policy of racial isolation. Brief for Appellee at 22, Jenkins 639 F. Supp.
19 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Nos. 90-2238, 91-3636, 92-3194, 92-3200, 93-3274). For a fur-
ther discussion of the original district court order in Jenkins, see supra notes 83-89
and accompanying text.
234. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct.. 2038, 2048 (1995) (citing Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971)). For a further discussion of
Swann, see supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of
Milliken I, see supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
235. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 25 (holding that "a school authority's remedial
plan or a district court's remedial decree is to be judged by its effectiveness.
Awareness of the racial composition of the whole school system is likely to be a
useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional viola-
tions."). Indeed,Judge Clark fully recognized Swann's limit on requiring a distinct
racial balance within the KCMSD. See id. at 24 (holding that district courts may not
require particular degree of racial balance or mixing). Rather, when Judge Clark
fashioned the original desegregation plan, he did not require any goal for racial
balance; instead, he implemented programs to attract majority students to the
KCMSD and more specifically to remedy the system wide reduction in student achieve-
ment. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 23-24.
236. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048-49. The Court viewed the appropriate in-
quiry to be "'whether the [constitutional violator] ha[s] complied in good faith
with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of
past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable."' Id. at 2049
(quoting Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991)). Indeed, even the
dissenting judge in the case leading to the Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins
recognized the KCMSD's failure to satisfy this standard. See Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 401
(Beam, J., dissenting) (finding that "indeed, the district court was justified in find-
ing that academic improvement in the seven years since the [desegregation] pro-
gram had been less than dramatic."). Rather than recognize this result as
justification for continuation of the desegregation plan, however, the majority in
Jenkins argued that student achievement does not set the standard for achieving
unitary status. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2049. This conviction effectively ignored the
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Moreover, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County placed the
burden of demonstrating these positive results on the constitutional viola-
tor.23 7 The majority in Jenkins failed to demonstrate that the State carried
this burden.2 38 In Green, the Supreme Court firmly admonished school
boards to come forward with effective desegregation remedies.23 9 In par-
ticular, the Court described several factors involved when evaluating a
school district's desegregation plan. 240 Thus, the Court established that
school authorities must take affirmative measures to eliminate vestiges of
fundamental goals of the original desegregation plan, which cited "reduced aca-
demic achievement" as the central effect of state-imposed segregation. Jenkins, 639
F. Supp. at 24.
237. 391 U.S. 430 (1968); accord Raney v. Board of Educ. 391 U.S. 443, 449
(1968) (release of jurisdiction merely upon showing that plan was adopted would
"be inconsistent with the responsibility imposed on the district court by Brown IT).
For a further discussion of Green, see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. In
Green, the Supreme Court held that:
The obligation of the district courts, as it always has been, is to assess the
effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation .... It is
incumbent upon the district court to weigh that claim in light of the facts
at hand and in light of any alternatives which may be shown as feasible
and more promising in their effectiveness .... Moreover, whatever plan
is adopted will require evaluation in practice, and the court should retain
jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been com-
pletely removed.
Green, 391 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added). Thus, Green illustrated that elimination
of segregation's effects must be demonstrated before a district court should liber-
ate a school district from judicial supervision. Id.
238. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2049-50. The State merely argued, on appeal to the
Supreme Court, that the district court's orders exceeded constitutional limitations.
Id. Justice Souter aptly noted this failure in his dissent, expressing the State's fail-
ure to even try to make the necessary showing in the litigation leading up to the
disputed district court order. Id. at 2074 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Jenkins, 19
F.3d at 400-02 (Beam,J., dissenting) (holding that specific level of education is not
among rights afforded protection under Constitution). Nonetheless, the proposi-
tion that there exists no federal right to a particular level of educational quality
remains irrelevant to Jenkins because the original desegregation order did not aim
to vindicate such a right. Brief for Appellee at 3, Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393
(8th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 90-2238, 91-3636, 92-3194, 92-3200, 93-3274). For a further
discussion of the original desegregation order, see supra notes 83-89.
239. See Green, 391 U.S. at 439 (holding that "burden on a school board today
is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises
realistically to work now").
240. Id. at 435 (noting that complete racial identification of system of schools,
extending to faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities is
indication that school system is not unitary); see Alexander v. Holmes County Bd.
of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (describing unitary system as one "within which
no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or color");
Brian K. Landsberg, The Desegregated School System and the Retrogression Plan, 48 LA. L.
REv. 789, 819 (1988) (explaining that racially identifiable schools, school place-
ment and effect of school desegregation on housing patterns are three types of
lingering effects relevant to Court's rulings on unitary status). For a further discus-
sion of these factors, see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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state-imposed discrimination. 241 Accordingly, the Jenkins majority's failure
to illustrate the KCMSD's success in eliminating the vestiges of segregation
supports the conclusion that the KCMSD did not deserve a declaration of
unitary status for its quality education programs.2 42
The majority in Jenkins also argued that the district court's ruling con-
cerning the KCMSD lost the words "to the extent practicable."2 43 The
majority implied that the KCMSD's quality education programs may have
achieved their maximum potential in the KCMSD. 244 In discounting the
continued below-average student test scores, the majority blamed this re-
sult on demographic factors unrelated to the effects of legal segrega-
241. See Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38 (holding that "[s]chool boards... operating
state-compelled dual systems ... [are] charged with the affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch"). Furthermore, subsequent
cases illustrated that in a proceeding for partial unitary status the burden of proof
is on the party attempting to show that a school district meets the requirements.
See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) (holding that school district in viola-
tion bears burden of showing that any current racial imbalance is not traceable to
prior violation).
242. See Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 402-03 (Beam, J., dissenting) (conceding that aca-
demic achievement was below national norms in KCMSD, but dismissing this fac-
tor as representative of vestiges of past discrimination). The Supreme Court in
Jenkins, however, declared that the State did not seek a declaration of partial uni-
tary status with respect to the quality education programs. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at
2055. In this regard, the State's desire concerning unitary status obviously
changed in the period between the Eighth Circuit's ruling in April 1994 and argu-
ments before the Supreme Court in January 1995.
243. Jenkins v. Missouri, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2055 (1995). The majority argued
that the district court's statement that the "KCMSD had not reached anywhere
close to its 'maximum potential because the District is still at or below national
norms at many- grade levels'" did not represent the appropriate test in deciding
whether a school district has achieved unitary status. Id.
244. Id. See also Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 403 (Beam, J., dissenting). The dissent in
the Eight Circuit case recognized the district court's April 16, 1993 finding that the
KCMSD has not reached anywhere close to its maximum potential in quality of
education, but argued that the question implicates "'whether the vestiges of past
discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable."' Id. (quoting
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991)). Thus, the dissenting judge
seemed to imply that "extent practicable" involves a far lesser standard to meet
than the "maximum potential" standard mentioned in the district court's order.
Likewise, the Supreme Court in Jenkins implied that constitutional compliance may
have been achieved in the KCMSD because the district had facilities and opportu-
nities not available anywhere else in the country. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2056.
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tion.245 This analysis, which attempts to separate demographic factors
from the vestiges of prior racial discrimination, remains questionable. 246
Moreover, the majority did not present any evidence that the educa-
tional programs worked "to the extent practicable" to eradicate the re-
duced and inequitable student achievement results identified as vestiges of
segregation in the original district court order.247 Although the majority
245. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2056. Likewise, Judge Beam's dissenting opinion in
the Eighth Circuit argued that continued below-average test scores resulted from
demographic factors "beyond [the school system's] control." See Jenkins, 19 F.3d at
402-03 (Beam, J., dissenting). However, just as the Eighth Circuit dissent provided
no evidence that supported this conclusion, neither did Justice Rehnquist in Jen-
kins. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2056; Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 402-03 (Beam, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit dissent itself recognized that it cited material outside
the record when referring to findings in an Omaha, Nebraska study that noted
demographic factors as a cause of low achievement in minority students. Jenkins,
19 F.3d at 402-03.
246. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1992) (holding that "[w]here
resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it does not
have constitutional implications. It is beyond the authority and beyond the practi-
cal ability of the federal courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and
massive demographic shifts."). One commentator noted, however, that the Court
in Freeman declined to consider whether the demographic shifts were inevitable or
whether they reflected a vestige of the dual system. Stewart, supra note 71, at 229.
Stewart further asserted that both sides of the desegregation debate in Freeman
recognized that residential segregation, in particular, results from private and pub-
lic decisions. Id.; see also Freeman, 503 U.S. at 503 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing
racially imbalanced schools are product of public and private decisions); Colum-
bus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 512 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(imbalance in residential housing patterns "result[s] from a melange of past hap-
penings prompted by economic considerations, private discrimination, discrimina-
tory school assignments or a desire to reside near people of one's own race or
ethnic background"). Stewart further articulated that the majority in Freeman
failed to acknowledge the effects that prior de jure segregation in public schools
can have on current residential patterns. Stewart, supra note 71, at 229. For
instance,
[a] school that, because of the racial makeup of its student population, its
faculty, or its staff, is identifiable as a "black" school may influence white
families not to settle in that district. And if an identifiably "black" school
is one whose quality of education or facilities is demonstrably inferior to
that of a "whiter" school, it may be unlikely to attract to that district fami-
lies who can afford to live elsewhere.
Id. Finally, Stewart noted that historical inequalities in the education that African-
American children receive relative to white students can have a significant effect
on a community's demographic profile. Id. This effect results from African-Ameri-
cans' decreased earning power, which in turn resulted from the unequal public
education the state provided them as children. Id. Thus, demographic factors and
school segregation are seemingly interdependent. Id. at 229-30.
247. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055-56. Nonetheless, prior Supreme Court deci-
sions distinctly require success in the educational components of a desegregation
remedy before a school district can obtain a declaration of unitary status. See Free-
man, 503 U.S. at 485 ("The duty and responsibility of a school district once segre-
gated by law is to take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the
unconstitutional dejure system."); Id. at 489 (stating that "the court's end purpose
must be to remedy the violation"). These holdings coincide with the Court's long-
stated requirement that "the [district] court should retain jurisdiction until it is
1454 [Vol. 40: p. 1395
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noted that the KCMSD offered more educational opportunity than any
other school system in America, it failed to demonstrate whether these
opportunities resulted in improved student achievement, beyond test
scores.248 This improvement represents the hallmark of a desegregation
order's success or failure.
249
Third, the majority's decision in Jenkins remains wholly inconsistent
with the holdings in Milliken I and Milliken 11.250 Milliken I mandated that
desegregation remedies may not extend beyond the district where the
constitutional violation exists.2 5' Three years later, in Milliken I, the
Court endorsed a district court's discretion to fashion a remedial desegre-
gation plan for a school district with vestiges of racial discrimination. 252
Thus, Milliken I and Milliken II authorized district courts to exercise broad
discretion when designing remedial desegregation plans for school dis-
tricts suffering from vestiges of state-imposed segregation. 253 Based on
clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed." Green v. New
Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis added). Although the
majority in Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 396, did not explicitly express this view, its reference
to its earlier panel decision supported this line of reasoning. SeeJenkins v. Mis-
souri, 11 F.3d 755, 764 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[T]o determine if KCMSD has achieved
unitary status [under Freeman], we must consider the constitutional injury, the
methods selected to remedy that injury, the goals of the remedy, and the success
achieved by the remedy in eliminating the vestiges of the constitutional violations
to the extent practicable.").
248. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2056.
249. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490. For a further discussion of this success require-
ment, see supra note 162.
250. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 279-283 (1977) (upholding district court's
ability to create remedial educational programs as part of school desegregation
remedy); Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (holding that desegregation reme-
dies must be limited to district where constitutional violation actually occurred).
For a further discussion of Milliken I and Milliken II, see supra notes 41-54 and
accompanying text. The district court followed these limitations when it designed
the original desegregation plan for the KCMSD. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 639 F.
Supp. 19, 23-25 (W.D. Mo 1985) (recognizing that scope of constitutional violation
limits power to use equitable powers). Indeed, this goal was the underpinning of
the magnet school program. Id. at 53-54. Realizing that it could not implement an
interdistrict remedy, the district court aimed to attract majority students to
KCMSD's schools through the establishment of high quality education programs.
Id. As one commentator noted, "[b] ecause the district court [in Jenkins] rejected
an interdistrict remedy, the only chance at ... true integration [was] ... that...
lavish new facilities and programs constructed by KCMSD . . . [would] entice a
sufficient number of private and suburban school children to transfer into the
District." Robert H. Freilich, Separate But Unequaled: The Need for Interdistrict Relief
Based on State Law, 24 URB. LAw. 637, 647 (1992). For further discussion of the
district court's original desegregation plan, see supra notes 83-89 and accompany-
ing text.
251. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746. For a further discussion of Milliken I, see supra
notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
252. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 282. For a further discussion of Milliken II, see
supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
253. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 746 (purpose of desegregation remedy is to
restore victims of discriminatory conduct to position they would have occupied in
absence of that conduct); see also Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280 (quoting Milliken I, 418
1995] NOTE 1455
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these holdings, the majority in Jenkins correctly deferred to Judge Clark's
discretionary ruling, which extended the programs beyond the 1992-93
school year.25 4
Moreover, the majority opinion in Jenkins opposes the doctrine articu-
lated in Freeman v. Pitts and Board of Education v. Dowell that during the
final phases of a desegregation case, the district court should address
whether the school board has complied in good faith with the desegrega-
tion decree, and whether the plan eliminates the vestiges of past discrimi-
nation to the extent practicable. 255
U.S. at 746) (same).' For a further discussion of Milliken Iand Milliken II, see supra
notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
254. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1994). (holding that
Milliken II quality education components of district court's remedy remain in ef-
fect). In addition, the Eighth Circuit's panel decision of November 29, 1993, rec-
ognized that the continuation of the Milliken II programs corresponded with the
district court's discretion and original desegregation goals. Jenkins v. Missouri, 11
F.3d 755, 760-61 (8th Cir. 1993). The Eighth Circuit quoted the remarks of Judge
Clark at a hearing on the 1992-93 budget:
The [c]ourt's goal was to integrate the Kansas City, Missouri, School Dis-
trict ... and all these other matters were elements to be used to try to
integrate the [KCMSD] .... That's the goal. And a high standard of
quality education. The magnet schools, the summer school program and
all these programs are tied to that goal .... But when [the State] says no
particular goal has been set, I think [it is] in error.
Id. at 761. The Eight Circuit affirmed the accuracy of this statement holding that
Judge Clark's continuation of the desegregation plan coincided with the goal of
elimination of vestiges of past discrimination, which had not been achieved. Id.
255. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992) (holding that district court
has discretion to withdraw its supervision of desegregation case incrementally, that
is, on fewer than all components of the remedy, where that approach corresponds
with "the purposes and objectives of [the court's] equitable power"). For a further
discussion of Freeman, see supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
The dissent used highly conclusory evidence in Jenkins regarding whether the
district court needed to retain jurisdiction on the educational components in or-
der to achieve the goals of the desegregation plan. See Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 402 n.2
(contending that quality of education programs met goals of desegregation plan).
Indeed, the dissent apparently adopted the reasoning of the State's witness, who
concluded that the educational programs involved "distinct and separate compo-
nents" and explained that he did not believe that the educational programs tied to
the goal of achieving desegregation. Brief for Appellee at 12, Jenkins v. Missouri,
19 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 90-2238, 91-3636, 92-3194, 92-3200, 93-3274).
These remarks ignored the fundamental purpose of the district court's original
desegregation plan. SeeJenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 23 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(underscoring interdependence of school desegregation components). For a fur-
ther discussion of the original desegregation remedy, see supra notes 83-89 accom-
panying text.
The Supreme Court in Freeman also reiterated the requirement that the rem-
edy must work to eliminate the vestiges of segregation before it is ended. Freeman,
503 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court's decisions in Dowell and
Freeman also correspond with the Court's long-held requirement, stated in Green v.
New Kent County School Board, that "the [district] court should retain jurisdiction
until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed." 391
U.S. 430, 439 (1968); accord Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443, 449 (1968)
(release ofjurisdiction upon showing merely that plan was adopted would "be in-
1456
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Upon reversing the Eighth Circuit, however, Justice Rehnquist
focused almost exclusively on this factor and concluded that the district
court's remedy embodied an unconstitutional "interdistrict" remedy.
25 6
In particular, the majority viewed the magnet school program as an
interdistrict remedy that lacked a proper basis on an interdistrict
violation.25 7
Despite Justice Rehnquist's lengthy reasoning on this matter, Justice
Souter properly dispensed with the majority's reasoning in his dissent.258
First, while the majority in Jenkins repeatedly described the magnet school
program as an interdistrict remedy exceeding the boundaries of the
KCMSD, the program did not originally aim to draw back Caucasian chil-
dren who moved to other school districts; rather, the program aimed to
draw back children attending private schools within the geographical con-
fines of the KCMSD, whose population remained primarily Caucasian.
25 9
Second, Justice Souter properly concluded that prior de jure segrega-
tion and later desegregation do not represent separate causes of white
flight.260 Accordingly, if both segregation and early desegregative efforts
caused white flight to private and suburban schools, then a desegregation
remedy aimed at luring those students back to the KCMSD is proper. The
remedy, however, cannot impinge on unitary school districts' ability to
function. 26 1 This holding coincides with the Court's ruling in Milliken I
and Milliken 11.262
Finally, the Jenkins majority mistakenly rejected student test scores as a
factor to consider in assessing unitary status. 263 The Supreme Court in
consistent with responsibility imposed on district courts in Brown IT). Thus, Free-
man stands for the position that the burden of proof, in a proceeding for partial
unitary status, is on the party attempting to show that a school district meets the
requirements set forth in the Court's opinions. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494.
256. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2049-51 (1995). The majority in-
voked this discussion through its adjudication of the salary order issue because the
State argued that the salary orders served an interdistrict goal. Id. at 2049.
257. Id. at 2053-54. See also id. at 2056-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that "desegregative attractiveness goal" transgressed boundaries of appropriate de-
segregation order).
258. Id. at 2083-84 (Souter, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 2083 n.4 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 855
F.2d 1285, 1302-03 (8th Cir. 1988). Evidently, therefore, a substantial justification
for the magnet program involved the attraction of students within the KCMSD,
thus exposing the majority's opinion to substantial criticism. Id. (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 2086 (Souter, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 2087-88 (Souter, J., dissenting).
262. See MiUiken , 418 U.S. 717, 737-38 (1994) (stating district court may sub-
ject proven constitutional wrongdoer to remedy with intended effects outside dis-
trict of violation when such remedy needs to redress harms flowing from
constitutional violation).
263. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055 (stating that "the District Court should sharply
limit, if not dispense with its reliance on this factor [test scores]"). See alsoJenkins
v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 404 (8th Cir. 1994) (Beam, J., dissenting) (stating that
district court relied solely on standardized test results to deny State's request for
1995] NOTE 1457
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Freeman noted that the district court compared African-American and Cau-
casian students' standardized test scores in reaching its unappealed find-
ing of a failure to achieve unitary status. 264 Indeed, several other district
courts have applied the same standard when evaluating the achievements
of a remedial desegregation plan. 26
5
partial unitary status; "a measure ... not required or permitted by the Constitu-
tion"). This argument, however, ignores the State's burden of showing that the
educational programs worked as fully as practicable to eradicate the reduced and
inequitable student achievement results recognized as vestiges of segregation. See
Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W.D. Mo. 1985) ("Segregation has caused
a system wide reduction in student achievement in the schools of the KCMSD."). In
addition, the State's one witness during the hearing on the educational programs
for 1992-93, Dr. Terrance Stewart, testified that the various educational compo-
nents of the desegregation remedy enhanced the level of educational opportuni-
ties available to students in the KCMSD, and that the resources provided equalled
or exceeded those available in area Missouri suburbs. Brief for Appellee at 9, Jen-
kins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Nos. 90-2238, 91-3636, 92-3194,
92-3200, 93-3274). However, Dr. Stewart admitted that he did not analyze whether
the components resulted in improved student achievement. Id. Indeed, one com-
mentator noted that between 1986 and 1993, only modest gains occurred in aca-
demic achievement. Morantz, supra note 226, at 1.
Furthermore, several commentators have noted the relevance of improved ac-
ademic test scores to desegregation efforts. See, e.g., Gwendolyn S. Andrey, Note,
The Missing Half ofMissouri v. Jenkins: Determining the Scope of a Judicial Desegregation
Remedy, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 253, 258 (1991) (noting that "researchers have
found that black students' achievement level has increased after desegregation");
Derrick A. Bell, Jr. Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (stating that public schools should
focus on educational achievement of African-American children rather than on
school desegregation); Kevin Brown, The Legal Rhetorical Structure for the Conversion
of Desegregation Lawsuits to Quality Education Lawsuits, 42 EMORY L.J. 791, 800-01
(1993) (explaining that district court in Freeman v. Pitts not only examined re-
source allocation, but also examined measures of student academic achievement
based upon African-Americans' performance on Iowa Tests of Basic Skills and
Scholastic Aptitude Test); Brown, supra note 3, at 1142 (arguing that "[i]f the
harm resulting from dejure segregation of public schools is viewed as lower educa-
tional achievement by African-American school children than by their white coun-
terparts, then in order to determine unitary status, courts should examine
objective educational achievement criteria"); Robert Crain, The Research on the Ef-
fects of School Desegregation: Real Estate Prices, College Degrees, and Miscellaneous Other
Things, in BROWN PLUS THIRTY: PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION 42 (Lamar P.
Miller, ed., 1986) (noting that many factors come into play when assessing desegre-
gation's effect on African-Americans' academic achievement); Hayman & Levit,
supra note 18, at 705 (deciphering Brown I to promise that "stigma" of African-
American inferiority would dissipate "because African-American children would
obtain greater facility with the dominant Euro-American criteria of achieve-
ment."); Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of
Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1041, 1117-26 (1984) (contending that for school sys-
tems in which it is not possible to obtain integration, court decrees should be di-
rected toward improving educational effectiveness of schools that minority
children attend).
264. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 483 (1992).
265. See, e.g., School Bd. of Richmond v. Bailes, 829 F.2d 1308, 1312 (4th Cir.
1987) (noting that standardized test scores above the 50th percentile on national
scale and only slightly lower than statewide average reflect "a potent indicator that
1458 [Vol. 40: p. 1395
64
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss5/3
V. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins marks a landmark turn in
the Court's progeny of desegregation cases. At the same time, however,
the Court's decision provides little guidance to federal courts currently
supervising desegregation orders. While previous Supreme Court prece-
dent exhibited an allowance for district courts' exercise of equitable dis-
cretion in fashioning desegregation orders, the Court's latest decision
signals a sharp blow to such courts' ability to oversee imposed desegrega-
tion plans. Moreover, the Jenkins Court failed to clarify the guidelines for
courts to use in assessing unitary status.
In the months since Jenkins, courts have embraced the Supreme
Court's holding to sharply curtail broad desegregation remedies. Essen-
tially, federal trial courts adopt the Jenkins Court's pronouncements that
federal supervision of local school systems should be temporary and that
constitutional remedies must directly relate to the constitutional viola-
tion.266 These goals, however, ignore what should be the primary goal of
any desegregation remedy: the advancement of high quality education for
all students-especially where past segregation obstructed the achieve-
ment of such an education. Moreover, while the Supreme Court in Jenkins
separated improvement in student achievement from quality of education,
such achievement should remain an important factor in assessing a deseg-
efforts to eliminate the effects of segregation have been successful"); United States
v. City of Yonkers, 833 F. Supp. 214, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that use of stan-
dardized test scores in measuring academic achievement, itself factored in deter-
mining whether equal educational opportunity is achieved, is proper); Coalition to
Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 757 F. Supp. 328, 332-33 (D. Del. 1991)
(finding that technical compliance with desegregation plan did not eradicate ves-
tiges of segregation, where significant differences between minority and majority
student achievement were still evident in student achievement tests, placement of
students in special education, absenteeism and suspensions).
266. See Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 901 F. Supp.
784, 794 (D. Del. 1995) ("'federal supervision of local systems was intended as a
temporary measure to remedy past discrimination."' (quoting Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at
2049)); Knight v. State of Ala., 900 F. Supp. 272, 348 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (any court
imposed remedy must "'directly address and relate to the constitutional violation
itselfW" (quoting Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2049)).
In Coalition, the district court granted the state board of education's motion
for a declaration of unitary status where it found that the defendants complied in
good faith with the goals of the original desegregation order. Coalition, 901 F.
Supp. at 823. The court noted, however, that certain aspects of the original deseg-
regation remedy changed since its original implementation in 1978. Id. Accord-
ingly, while the court addressed the high degree of achieved racial balance in the
school district, the court's decision lacked a significant analysis of the quality of
education. Indeed the court noted that "the focus of the relief has shifted from
the desegregation process itself to the fact of a multicultural student body with
varying education problems." Id. Moreover, the court admitted in a footnote that
"[o]ne of the fundamental issues implicitly posed by this litigation is whether the
time has come to return the focus of the public school system to matters of quality
education rather than social policy." Id. at 823 n.52.
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regation remedy's success. The holding in Jenkins casts doubt on courts'
ability to effectively refer to this factor in their evaluations. 267
Prior to Jenkins, desegregation precedent mandated that courts not
adhere to strict guidelines when evaluating a school district's desegrega-
tion efforts. Rather, federal courts adapted factors suited to the unique
constitutional violation under supervision. This analysis ensured that dif-
fering circumstances would receive the personalized attention they
required.
In finding that the KCMSD desegregation plan's focus on "desegrega-
tive attractiveness" via magnet schools constituted an improper interdis-
trict remedy, the Supreme Court turned a new page in the desegregation
chronicles. Although the holdings in Milliken I and Milliken II limited the
ability of courts to impose interdistrict remedies, courts now face sharp
limitations in applying desegregation plans that may have any substantial
effects outside the formerly violative school district. Without question, this
holding severely limits courts' ability to oversee desegregation plans where
"white flight" has precluded substantial progress in desegregation.
Finally, without the Supreme Court's establishment of a set of criteria
for determining unitariness, lower federal courts must continue to exer-
cise broad discretion in desegregation cases. While this state of affairs ap-
propriately allows federal district courts to tailor remedies to the diverse
needs of school districts, the fulfillment of the promise of an equal educa-
tion for the nation's children will be circumscribed until courts can use
such factors to achieve established desegregative goals.
Jordan A. LaVine
267. See Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1282 (D.
Colo. 1995) ("The Supreme Court's opinion in ... Jenkins... defeats the plaintiffs'
call for compelling additional action to investigate and redress racial disparities in
student achievements and participation in special programs for gifted and talented
pupils.").
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